

## **International Peace and Prosperity Project—Guinea-Bissau**

### *Project Review*

**CDA Collaborative Learning Projects**

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**Map of Guinea-Bissau**

## Executive Summary

This Project Review regarding the International Peace & Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau was undertaken by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects on behalf of the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) and the private donor, Milt Lauenstein, with the willing participation of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIAN), the project implementer. The purposes of the Project Review were:

1. To discern whether and how the IPPP has contributed to reducing the likelihood of political violence in Guinea-Bissau;
2. To suggest ways to proceed with additional IPPP engagements in Guinea-Bissau, building on past efforts, and taking into account current political dynamics; and
3. To identify preliminary lessons that could be relevant to subsequent efforts to prevent violent conflict, especially elsewhere in West Africa.<sup>1</sup>

The CDA team relied on two main sources of information: a) interviews with a wide range of people in Guinea-Bissau, with a small number of regional observers in Dakar, Senegal, and with project staff and consultants based mostly in Canada; and b) project documents and other reports.

### *Situation in Guinea-Bissau*

Guinea-Bissau is an ethnically diverse nation of 1.5 million people in West Africa located between Senegal and Guinea. The nation has endured political instability since its independence from Portugal in 1974. Since gaining independence, the country's leaders have done little to develop the economy or the education, health, and judicial systems. Guinea-Bissau consistently ranks near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, and its citizens have a life expectancy of only 46 years. Weak governance institutions and corruption have undermined development in Guinea-Bissau throughout the post-colonial era and fostered the political instability that led to the 1998-99 civil war. Following a short interim presidency, Guinea-Bissau held democratic presidential elections in 2000, but in 2003 the military overthrew the elected president. The next round of presidential elections was held in 2005, when the current president was elected.

One objective of this Project Review was to determine, if possible, whether progress is being made in Guinea-Bissau towards reduced vulnerability to violence, and whether IPPP contributed to progress since 2004. To explore that question, we asked in almost every interview how the situation has changed over the past five years: "How is the situation now different from 2003? Is the situation worse or better or the same?"

Most of those we interviewed considered that the situation in Guinea-Bissau has improved over the past five years; only a few were more pessimistic or cynical. The most consistent factor cited as an indicator of progress was a much greater openness to

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<sup>1</sup> The proposed Global Crisis Prevention Mechanism, which involves many of the same people who helped launch the IPPP, intends to develop a second violence prevention initiative in West Africa, and is interested in incorporating lessons from the Guinea-Bissau experience.

dialogue, debate, and even open public criticism of the government—something considered impossible five years ago. In addition, various elements of government, including the President, Prime Minister, National Assembly, and armed forces, are now seen to engage in open disagreements among themselves on occasion, without dire consequences. The government and armed forces appear more sensitive to the demands of the international community, as indicated by a greater adherence to standards of human rights.

Despite the greater openness to debate, several interviewees asserted that the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau has worsened—or has not improved, citing increased state fragility, “political implosion” and crisis, increased criminality, and drug trafficking. People universally acknowledged that the judicial system is inoperative.

It is clear to the review team that, by and large, the situation has improved, at least in terms of any sense of impending eruptions of violence. There are still significant apprehensions regarding instability, insecurity and recurrent political crises, but people do not appear concerned about a descent into violence in the short-term. This progress comes as the result of multiple actors and influences, so direct attribution to IPPP would be impossible and even undesirable. However, we have identified in some detail ways in which IPPP has contributed to reducing the likelihood of violence. (See Section V, Reflections on the Program.

### ***Overall Programmatic Approach of IPPP***

In brief, the IPPP works according to the following program model—each element of which is explained in the text:

1. Perform ongoing situation analysis;
2. Identify points of leverage and/or points for urgent intervention;
3. Provide small amounts of funding or other resources to catalyze action, usually with a strategic partner;
4. Intervene at Track 1 and Track 2 levels, including both public and quiet diplomacy initiatives; and
5. Link to the international community and advocate for actions by other entities

Section V of the report reflects on how the program activities following this general outline have addressed elements of the conflict, as presented in Section IV.

### ***Systems Analysis of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau***

The CDA team developed an analysis of the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau, based on information provided by those interviewed in the field, as well as secondary sources. (See Section IV.) The core of the conflict is described by local people as an “elite power struggle,” characterized by high-stakes efforts to gain and maintain power and access to scarce resources. Patronage politics, centered on powerful men, dominates the political landscape. These elements are reinforced by factors of exclusion and favoritism, often with ethnic and regional dimensions. High insecurity discourages investment, resulting

an extremely weak private sector and scarce employment opportunities for young people, who are then vulnerable to being recruited into violence.

### ***Application of the OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria<sup>2</sup>***

The report uses the Criteria for the Evaluation of Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Programmes developed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as one lens for reflecting on the project. The following is a brief summary of the conclusions from this analysis.

#### **1. Relevance and appropriateness: *Does the effort address key driving factors of conflict that constitute elements likely to lead to political violence? How?***

At the beginning of the project, IPPP focused on crisis management efforts, with particular attention to the military situation and the impending elections, as noted already among the contributions of the program. In the short term, these were quite relevant actions. As the situation calmed considerably towards the end of 2005, IPPP turned to consideration of a broader program of action, based primarily in the National Action Plan developed by a multi-stakeholder group in February of 2006.

Subsequently, IPPP undertook a series of efforts during 2006 and 2007 aimed at youth, security sector reform and reconciliation within the military, dialogue processes, business development, and continued support to journalists. In addition, IPPP supported development of the National Reconciliation Commission, in cooperation with ECOWAS. Each of these elements can be seen to address one or more of the key factors of conflict. In summary, IPPP's efforts have been highly relevant and appropriate, while not attempting, quite rightly, to address all important elements of the conflict.

#### **2. Effectiveness: *To what extent did the program achieve its stated goals?***

Despite its stated mission, themes and elements, procedural guides and principles, it is nevertheless difficult to identify with any specificity the actual goals and objectives of the program. Despite this lack of specificity with regard to goals/objectives, we can ask whether IPPP has achieved its overall goal of reducing violence or the potential for violence in the country—and to what extent any such reduction can be attributed to the efforts of IPPP. Many local observers, partners and participants consider that IPPP has contributed to the reduction of the threat of violence in the country, especially during the run-up to the election in 2005, through interventions with regard to the role of the military and SSR, support to the Citizen's Goodwill Task Force and journalists, as well as initiation of efforts for reconciliation within the military and more broadly.

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<sup>2</sup> Anderson, Mary B., Diana Chigas, and Peter Woodrow. "Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Toward DAC Guidance." Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (September 2007). Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/24/39341279.pdf>.

**3. Efficiency: *Did the intervention deliver its outputs and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)?***

The IPPP has been operating on approximately \$300,000 each year. One of its major strategies is to catalyze larger actions by providing small grants to get something moving in a key area, offering technical assistance, and organizing rather modest dialogue efforts. Considering the reasonably-sized overall budget (neither small/underfunded nor grossly over-resourced) and the quite small injections of cash, the IPPP program must be considered quite efficient.

**4. Impact: *What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort?***

The CDA team asked almost all interviewees what they thought the main contributions of the IPPP have been. The following represent the elements mentioned most often in those interviews:

- Support to the Citizens Good Will Task Force and to journalists during the 2005 elections.
- Getting the Security Sector Reform process off the blocks.
- Initiating the National Reconciliation Commission with ECOWAS.
- Supporting the military reconciliation process and civil-military dialogue.
- Ongoing support to journalists.

**5. Sustainability: *Are the processes, structures and mechanisms conducted or promoted by the program likely to continue after direct involvement ends? To what extent were they locally-driven?***

In some ways, if IPPP ceased operations tomorrow, it would cause barely a ripple on the local scene, partly because the IPPP team deliberately keeps a low profile and has no ongoing local presence. On the positive side, IPPP has not created any dependency, relying, rather, on small actions that have avoided generating unrealistic expectations or unsustainable programming. On the other hand, no one in Guinea-Bissau “owns” the violence prevention agenda, particularly not at an organizational level. So far, there is no shared understanding among a significant group of people of what violence prevention means in Guinea-Bissau or what the specific elements might be of a comprehensive plan to reduce the vulnerability to violence. Thus despite the real contributions of IPPP, it is not clear that the progress the program has helped catalyze will be sustained.

**6. Linkages: *How are program efforts linked to higher/lower levels (community, national, regional) and to parallel efforts in other sectors/domains (across sectors)?***

IPPP has done well at integrating approaches to official actors (Track 1) and civil society (Track 2), including some activities that engaged both groups, such as the National Action Plan process in 2006 and the dialogue regarding the formation of a National Reconciliation Commission in 2007. IPPP has worked in a range of sectors and issues: military/DDR/SSR, civil society strengthening, economic development, media development, election monitoring, youth, etc. Some of those interviewed praised IPPP’s

independence and relative neutrality—a rare commodity in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, others criticized IPPP for working in a fairly isolated manner, without taking notice of what others are doing.

### ***Strengths and Weaknesses of the IPPP***

The following is a brief summary of the main points:

#### ***Strengths***

- The program has provided quick funding to provide impetus for important initiatives or move things that are stuck.
- IPPP has organized dialogue processes and modeled multi-stakeholder interactions.
- It has made small pushes on specific economic questions (incubator study, cashew production, trade fair, and youth roster).
- IPPP grants have, on occasion, catalyzed funding from other sources.
- The program has worked across different levels/sectors: it is nimble and flexible.
- IPPP staff maintain remarkable access to government officials.
- The program has put Guinea-Bissau on the map through various forms of advocacy.
- Technical assistance providers from outside of Guinea-Bissau (like Search for Common Ground) have been identified and brought in.

#### ***Weaknesses/Areas for Improvement***

- IPPP lacks a consistent presence in the country—which makes follow through difficult at times.
- The “flip side” of flexibility/nimbleness is that the program can appear to be scattered, inconsistent, and it is difficult to maintain relationships as the focus shifts.
- Communication with partners has not been consistent, particularly with civil society and NGO groups.
- There are a number of “loose ends”—initiatives that were started and have not been followed through.
- Some organizations that IPPP has supported with rapid small grants also require long-term funding and have specific technical assistance needs.
- IPPP has generally reacted to crisis or near-crisis situations, rather than proactively building the capacity of local institutions to anticipate and mitigate potential conflict situations before they intensify.

#### ***Recommendations***

The CDA has made the following recommendations—each of which is explained fully in the report.

1. Develop specific goals and objectives
2. Reconsider the staffing model

3. Develop a common understanding and overall approach to conflict prevention among local leaders
4. Address the conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention potential of all programming in Guinea-Bissau
5. Establish a simple mechanism for consultation and decision making
6. Build capacity for conflict management
7. Attend to loose ends (or acknowledge dead ends...)
8. Consider a broader advocacy strategy
9. Strengthen partnerships and communication
10. Develop a monitoring and evaluation plan
11. Produce an exit plan

### *Lessons Learned*

The IPPP reveals several lessons that may inform the implementation of other similar efforts aimed at violence reduction. Again, these are summary statements that are enlarged upon in the report.

*The Basic IPPP Model Works:* With some logical departures demanded by local conditions, the project has followed the essential outlines of the original concept. This approach has proved viable and—again with appropriate adaptations—applicable to other similar situations.

*Adherence to Guiding Principles:* The IPPP has articulated a set of principles that has guided decision making. These principles, which can be stated as a series of “thou shalt” and “thou shalt nots” are valuable advice to anyone seeking to deter violence.

*Flexibility/Agility versus Follow-through/Persistence:* Conflict prevention efforts need to maintain maximum flexibility—and pursue multiple initiatives simultaneously, especially during times of impending crisis or escalating violence when “operational prevention” must be the priority. On the other hand, the underlying conflict dynamics are long-term systems that change only quite slowly. These elements are addressed through efforts at “structural prevention” that require more careful analysis, effective strategies for change over time, longer-term planning, consistent resources, and greater follow through.

*Addressing Both Track 1 and Track 2 Work:* The IPPP has had remarkable access to official actors—government ministers, military leaders, the Prime Minister, and other highly placed individuals, as well as with key civil society leaders. Future intervention efforts should consider the appropriate mix of initiatives in relation to government and civil society, based on an analysis of the situation and the views of local partners.

*Ongoing Local Presence versus Multiple Visits:* Except for a brief period when IPPP had a local coordinator, it has functioned entirely on the basis of periodic trips from staff or consultants based in North America, Europe, or elsewhere in West Africa. We see clear advantages to this “light-on-the-ground” approach, and consider it part of the principle of flexibility. However, we are not sure that this model should be taken as a proven rule

that is applicable to all circumstances. Rather, we would suggest that the decision regarding whether to adopt a “no-ongoing-presence” model or to establish some form of local office and/or staffing should be guided by the needs of each situation.

*Working with Local Leaders:* IPPP has been working with an extraordinary group of local partners—from government and from civil society. The principle of identifying and supporting such people has proven to be fully justified. Every society will have courageous and creative people who are ready to lead their society towards a stable peace with greater justice. Nonetheless, the Guinea-Bissau experience suggests a number of challenges and dilemmas: how to address the time constraints of busy people; how to build skills; how to develop a common understanding and a common agenda regarding conflict prevention; and how to engage local leaders in an advisory role in relation to the project.

### ***The Uniqueness of IPPP***

While IPPP has followed commonly-accepted practice in a number of ways, it has also broken new ground or placed unique emphasis on specific elements. Four aspects of the IPPP approach appear a bit more unusual—in degree, if not in kind:

- IPPP bases the decision of where and whether to intervene on an analysis of available information regarding the nature of conflict and the likelihood that violence will erupt. In other words, the decision is data-driven and based on need. Many organizations are guided more by organizational expertise and previous contacts.
- IPPP has taken the idea of being flexible and nimble to a high art. While many aspire to be responsive, IPPP has the ability to mobilize financial resources quickly, largely due to its private and independent funding source. On occasion, it has also been able to provide needed technical expertise in a rapid manner.
- IPPP has maintained a clear focus on violence prevention. Other organizations typically pursue a broader agenda associated with development, humanitarian assistance or even a more expansive peace initiative.
- Relationship building—at all levels—is at the heart of the IPPP approach. While other organizations build relations as needed to get the work done, IPPP considers this as fundamental to its approach.

Possibly, the uniqueness of IPPP lies in the way that it has combined the various elements cited above, but even this does not provide a completely satisfactory answer to the uniqueness question. We would suggest that, at its heart, IPPP:

- Remains engaged but not enmeshed (in other words, it continues to be interested and intermittently present, but does not become a part of the local scene or beholden to donors, other national interests or even the international community);
- Holds no agenda apart from violence prevention, maintaining neutrality, except in opposition to violence; and

- Is remarkably free to follow immediate and longer-term needs and to deal with any/all political actors, as demanded by the situation and within its violence prevention mandate.

If one were to seek an analogy, this configuration appears much like a Special Representative of the Secretary General—but without the baggage of the UN system! While many SRSGs are effective, they are also constrained by the very official and visible nature of their positions and by the requirement that they deal directly and primarily with the government in power. The representatives of IPPP, on the other hand, are able to perform many of the same functions, but relying solely on the credibility they gain through personal interactions and their greater flexibility to engage directly and quietly with any and all stakeholders. IPPP is accountable primarily to its mission of preventing violence, rather than to a series of competing national and international interests.

## **International Peace and Prosperity Project—Guinea-Bissau *Project Review***

### **I. Introduction & Background to the Project Review**

This Project Review regarding the International Peace & Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau was undertaken on behalf of the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) and the private donor, Milt Lauenstein, with the willing participation of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIAN), the project implementer. The Project Review has pursued several specific goals, as described in the full Terms of Reference (see Appendix A):

1. To discern whether and how the IPPP has contributed to reducing the likelihood of political violence in Guinea-Bissau;
2. To suggest ways to proceed with additional IPPP engagements in Guinea-Bissau, building on past efforts, and taking into account current political dynamics; and
3. To identify preliminary lessons that could be relevant to subsequent efforts to prevent violent conflict, especially elsewhere in West Africa.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the Project Review, we have attempted to build on previous efforts to capture lessons and provide forward direction of the project. Specifically, we have drawn on an evaluation performed in 2006, a case study commissioned in 2007, and a lessons-learned workshop held in 2007. The products from each of these initiatives provided valuable information and background documentation for the Project Review.

#### **Approach to the Project Review**

##### ***Project Review Team***

The CDA team was led by Peter Woodrow, Co-Director of CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP), with the able assistance of Stephen Murphy, a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University. In addition to his exposure to peacebuilding concepts in the Fletcher School program, Stephen speaks Cape Verdean Creole, which is quite close to the Creole spoken in Guinea-Bissau. Stephen has focused his thesis research on Guinea-Bissau during this past year, and was, therefore, already familiar with the current situation there.

##### ***Issues in Project Review***

CDA, mainly through its Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, has been working with the communities dedicated to the prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding regarding

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<sup>3</sup> The proposed Global Crisis Prevention Mechanism, which involves many of the same people who helped launch the IPPP, intends to develop a second violence prevention initiative in West Africa, and is interested in incorporating lessons from the Guinea-Bissau experience.

a broad range of issues and controversies regarding the evaluation of programs that aim to contribute to peace. To date, experience shows that it is possible, using standard methods, to evaluate the immediate *outputs* (activities performed, events held, numbers of participants engaged, etc.) against project plans. More importantly, it is possible to ascertain the proximate *outcomes* of those efforts, in terms of changes in behaviors, attitudes, establishment of new institutions, improvement of relationships, and so forth. The peacebuilding<sup>4</sup> community as a whole is still struggling with the issue of how to measure *impacts* on what we have called “Peace Writ Large,” or the broader societal level peace. Here, the question is, given the successful delivery of outputs and observable outcomes, can we determine if these have contributed to the broader peace?

IPPP’s activities have been documented through various reports, evaluations and the recent case study.<sup>5</sup> As over three years have passed since the first scouting mission to Guinea-Bissau in October 2004, we believe there is sufficient evidence to consider the direct and indirect effects of activities undertaken in the early years of the project. Thus, we have attempted to identify how the IPPP has contributed to violence prevention over the past three years, looking at the evidence on the ground in the field and making reasonable projections regarding how seeds planted may bear fruit in the future.

## **Methodology**

The CDA team relied on two main sources of information: a) interviews with a wide range of people in Guinea-Bissau, with a small number of regional observers in Dakar, Senegal, and with project staff and consultants based mostly in Canada; and b) project documents and other reports.

## ***Interviews***

In order to understand the “story” of a particular geographical setting and the programs undertaken there, CDA relies on listening closely to a wide range of people. These interviews are focused conversations, rather than the implementation of a survey or questionnaire. In our experience, no single interview is sufficient to draw conclusions; rather, patterns of agreement and disagreement do emerge from multiple sources, and these add up to a more complete picture.

In our review of the IPPP, the team held conversations with project staff and consultants, local leaders and officials in Guinea-Bissau, direct program participants, representatives of non-governmental organizations (particularly working on other peacebuilding efforts or in related fields, such as human rights), and informed local and international observers

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<sup>4</sup> Over time, the term “peacebuilding” has come to embrace the entire broader field of those engaged in what CDA calls “peace practice,” including people who refer to their own work by the terms “conflict resolution,” “conflict transformation,” “conflict management,” and “conflict prevention.” The latter group, more precisely is trying to prevent *violent* conflict, and this is the subset of the field most closely associated with the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau.

<sup>5</sup> Readers will find a thorough recounting of these events in Appendix C.

(diplomats, aid officials, and UN officials). We tried to hear from the relevant categories of people: men and women, old and young, and from different political tendencies.

The CDA team was provided with lists of potential interviewees from among the many contacts the IPPP has developed over the past years, including some who are critical of the IPPP approach or specific actions. While we could not, in a short period, interview all contacts, we were able to meet with approximately 26 people (some were groups in which we did not get an accurate count) representing a range of viewpoints. A full list of those interviewed is provided in Appendix B.

### ***Document Review***

The CDA team reviewed various documents, including:<sup>6</sup>

- IPPP documents and analyses, including (but not limited to) the CIAN Three Year Plan and Budget for IPPP in Guinea-Bissau (September 2007) and “Judging when Prevention is Successful: Indicators for Measuring Changes in the Causes of Conflict” (January 2008);
- Descriptions of the initial IPPP program model, previous evaluations and other conceptual/analytical documents (much of which is described in the 2007 case study by Angela Kachuyevski); and
- Reports/documents from partner organizations, and reports, analyses and research regarding Guinea-Bissau.

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<sup>6</sup> A full listing of documents referenced and consulted in provided in Appendix D.

## II. The Situation in Guinea-Bissau: Past & Present<sup>7</sup>

Guinea-Bissau is an ethnically diverse nation of 1.5 million people in West Africa located between Senegal and Guinea. The nation has endured political instability since its independence from Portugal in 1974. Upon gaining independence, Guinea-Bissau's political elite abandoned the socialist tenets of revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral, who was assassinated in 1973, and since then, the country's leaders have done little to develop the economy or the education, health, and judicial systems. Guinea-Bissau consistently ranks near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, and its citizens have a life expectancy of only 46 years.<sup>8</sup>

Weak governance institutions and corruption have undermined development in Guinea-Bissau throughout the post-colonial era and fostered the political instability that led to the 1998-99 civil war. The immediate trigger of the unrest was President Nino Viera's dismissal of the military chief of staff, Ansoumané Mané, whom he accused of selling arms to the Casamance rebels in Senegal. Mané then led the army in revolt against President Viera, who received military support from Senegal and Guinea. During the course of the war, two-thirds of the military and the majority of the population backed Mané. With widespread support, Mané and his troops drove Viera into exile and the Senegalese and Guinean troops out of Guinea-Bissau.<sup>9</sup>

Following the short interim presidency of Malam Sanha, Guinea-Bissau held democratic presidential elections in 2000. However, in 2003 the military overthrew the elected president, Kumba Yala. The country held its next round of presidential elections in 2005. Interestingly, former president Nino Viera returned from exile as a candidate and won the election against Sanha and Yala. International observers judged the election as free and fair,<sup>10</sup> and the members of civil society that we interviewed confirmed that Viera actually seemed like a slightly more promising candidate than his rivals, who had not distinguished themselves as capable leaders during their brief presidencies. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 2008, but according to the constitution, the term for current members of the National Assembly ended as of April 30, 2008. During the team visit in early April, some people judged this to be a potential crisis.

### IPPP Analyses of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau

IPPP staff and consultants have been engaged in an ongoing process of analysis, as they have visited Guinea-Bissau and undertaken repeated conversations with local partners,

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<sup>7</sup> This section presents a brief history and a description of how the program has viewed the situation. Section IV will present a conflict analysis, based on the field interviews.

<sup>8</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), country profile accessed on April 30, 2008: <http://www.irinnews.org/country.aspx?CountryCode=GW&RegionCode=WA>.

<sup>9</sup> The details of the 1998-99 civil war are recounted in Jens Kovsted and Finn Tarp, "Guinea-Bissau: War, Reconstruction, and Reform," UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) Working Paper No. 168, 1999, 10-15 and Joshua Forrest, *Lineages of State Fragility*, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), 229-232.

<sup>10</sup> In an interview, the ECOWAS representative in Guinea-Bissau claimed that the elections were among the most free and fair that he has witnessed in Africa.

government officials, and international observers. This ongoing process has produced an informal mental mapping of both the deeper and longer-term picture, as well as the more superficial and constant shifts in the political landscape. So far as we could see, although staff members (mainly Ben Hoffman and Philippe Patry) seem to have a firm grasp of the situation, their analysis has not been recorded in any way that is easily accessible by others. (This does not make the analysis less valid, only less accessible or easily questioned.)

The main explicit conflict analysis process by IPPP was performed with diverse local stakeholders (representing multiple groups from different political perspectives, civil society, government, religious leaders, military, etc.) during the National Action Plan process in February 2006. That group identified eight “root causes” of conflict in Guinea-Bissau:<sup>11</sup>

1. Crisis in State Affirmation (e.g. the state is weak)
2. Lack of qualified human resources
3. Inadequacy and lack of clear goals in the educational and profession training systems
4. Mistrust in win-win dialogue
5. Manipulation of national security and defense force for political means
6. Lack of favorable climate for business and investment
7. Increase of non-conciliatory interest groups
8. Struggle for power

The group of stakeholders participating in the National Action Plan process also identified eight “key problems” and a range of consequences. Unfortunately, these read like a laundry list of social and political ills and of the overall development needs of the country, rather than a conflict analysis related more closely to the potential for violence. Moreover, when people point to a “lack” of something, they are usually suggesting a solution rather than a problem, and that “more” of it will solve the problem.

**Eight key problems:**

1. Lack of Trade Culture
2. Lack of Education/Professional Training
3. Lack of Political Tools to Solve Ethnic, Religious and Military Issues
4. Lack of a National Image
5. Lack of Good Administration
6. Army
7. Economic Stagnation
8. Lack of Justice

**Consequences/impacts:**

- Political Instability
- Corruption
- Lack of a National Image
- Rise of HIV
- Unemployment
- Extreme Poverty
- Strikes and Late Payment of Salaries
- Criminality
- Lack of Development
- Permanent Conflicts
- Permanent Political Crisis
- Lack of Democracy
- Violence
- Lack of Good Political Will

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<sup>11</sup> “National Action Plan for Peace and Prosperity in Guinea-Bissau: A Consensus Document.” International Peace and Prosperity Project, February 18, 2006.

As we will discuss further below, the IPPP has adopted a flexible and responsive approach to conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau. In the months following the February 2006 workshop and the production of the National Action Plan, IPPP attempted to use the NAP as a guide for follow-up activities. As of late 2006, however, the NAP was dropped as a guide and IPPP staff and consultants have been proceeding on the basis of their ongoing informal analysis and political instincts. This seems to be resulting in effective programming (more on that below). Nevertheless, the project review team noted that there is a) no shared analysis of the nature of the ongoing conflict in Guinea-Bissau among key IPPP partners; and b) no shared understanding of what might constitute a comprehensive approach to violence prevention in the country, which could inform the development of prevention initiatives by multiple organizations or government agencies. As discussed below, many groups are engaged in useful activities, but there is little sense of how these add up to violence prevention for the country or how stronger linkages among different efforts might make all more effective.

### **Changes in the Situation from 2004 to the Present**

One objective of this project review was to determine, if possible, whether progress is being made in Guinea-Bissau towards reduced vulnerability to violence, and whether IPPP contributed to any progress since 2004. In order to explore that question, we asked in almost every interview how the situation has changed over the past five years: “How is the situation now different from 2003? Is the situation worse or better or the same? If it has changed, how?”

Most of those we interviewed considered that the situation in Guinea-Bissau has improved over the past five years; only a few were more pessimistic or cynical. The most consistent factor cited as an indicator of progress was a much greater openness to dialogue, debate, and even open public criticism of the government—something considered impossible five years ago. In addition, various elements of government, including the President, Prime Minister, National Assembly, and armed forces, are now seen to engage in open disagreements among themselves on occasion, without dire consequences. As noted above, the government and armed forces appear much more sensitive to the demands of the international community, as indicated by a greater adherence to standards of human rights.

Even the military is no longer immune to public challenge by the media and/or civil society—a fact not universally welcomed by the officers we spoke with! The more cynical voices suggested that the military and their government allies are simply becoming more subtle and less visible in their exercise of influence, in contrast to the blatant abuses of the past. Others affirmed that the military has become more professional, increasingly refusing to be drawn directly into political matters. The armed forces have also moved to put their own house in order through emphasis on unity and reconciliation, largely as a result of the leadership from General Tagmé Na Wai, the Chief of Staff.

Many people also felt that there has been some economic progress in recent years. Several private banks have opened and trade and commerce have increased noticeably. However, there is still a lack of significant investment in the private sector, and unemployment, especially among the youth, remains a serious issue. Some observers noted that government salaries are more often paid on time, which has reduced tension. Nevertheless, many also acknowledged that the situation of impunity, corruption, and lawlessness had worsened and had opened the door to drug trafficking, a major security concern, as the country cannot control its own borders.

Despite the greater openness to debate, several interviewees asserted that the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau has worsened—or has not improved. Only one group felt this acutely (and they may have been exaggerating their concern in the mistaken impression that the review team was in a position to influence IPPP funding decisions!), citing increased state fragility, “political implosion” and crisis, increased criminality, and drug trafficking. People universally acknowledged that the judicial system is inoperative.

It is clear to the review team that, by and large, the situation has improved, at least in terms of any sense of impending eruptions of violence. There are still significant apprehensions regarding instability, insecurity and recurrent political crises, but people do not appear concerned about a descent into violence in the short-term. Logically and naturally, this progress comes as the result of multiple actors and influences, so direct attribution to IPPP would be impossible and even undesirable. However, we can identify in some detail several ways in which IPPP has contributed to reducing the likelihood of violence. These are elaborated in Section V, Reflections on the Program.

### **III. The IPPP Program Approach**

In this section, we will examine the overall program approach of the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau, including how program priorities have been set, decisions made, and activities set in motion. We will then consider in the next Section how the various project activities have contributed to preventing violence.

#### **Origins of the IPPP**

The IPPP concept grew out a series of consultations among about ten experts, convened by Milt Lauenstein in 2003. The group, which called itself the Reducing Political Violence Action Group, decided to initiate a pilot effort to prevent violence, and developed the essentials of an approach, which was to be long-term, locally-led, multifaceted, and collaborative.<sup>12</sup> After wide consultation and consideration of several possible sites for intervention, the group determined that Guinea-Bissau would be a good place to try the approach and see what worked or did not work. An initial scouting mission was launched in 2004, resulting in the ongoing project.<sup>13</sup>

#### **Overall Programmatic Approach of IPPP**

In brief, the IPPP works according to the following program model—each element of which is explained below:

1. Perform ongoing situation analysis;
2. Identify points of leverage and/or points for urgent intervention
3. Provide small amounts of funding or other resources to catalyze action, usually with a strategic partner;
4. Intervene at Track 1 and Track 2 levels, including both public and quiet diplomacy initiatives; and
5. Link to the international community and advocate for actions by other entities

#### ***Perform an Ongoing Analysis***

In order to determine where, when, and how to intervene for violence prevention, it is necessary to understand the situation. Such an analysis cannot be performed once, but must be an ongoing part of the program. As already discussed above, the principal IPPP staff have done their own analysis on an ongoing basis, informed by their multiple contacts in the country during their regular visits. In addition, they convened a group of stakeholders to undertake a joint analysis, which resulted in the National Action Plan. In the conflict prevention mode, the purpose of the analysis is to identify situations, issues, or dynamics that require some form of intervention to forestall violence.

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<sup>12</sup> This essential model was originally outlined by Michael Lund in “Following through on the Promise and Performance of Conflict Prevention: Toward an Action Plan,” October 23, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> A more complete narrative description of the IPPP process is provided in Kachuyevski, Angela. “The International Peace and Prosperity Project in Guinea-Bissau.” Draft Case Study (July 2007).

### ***Identify Points of Leverage and/or Points for Urgent or Long-term Intervention***

One of the unique elements of the IPPP approach is its constant search for places where a fairly modest and time-limited action will make a difference in the conflict dynamics. In essence, IPPP staff monitor the situation in order to find specific situations where a small amount of resource will move things forward. In some cases, these are situations where *something is “stuck”* and needs injection of resources or ideas to become unstuck. In other cases, it is a matter of *bringing the right people together* for dialogue or addressing urgent circumstances in a timely manner. Finally, IPPP often identifies an *issue* that needs sustained attention. The challenge for IPPP is how to discern which situation to respond to—as there will always be more to be done than IPPP can or should address.

We should also point out that there are two major modes of intervention in violence prevention: urgent, short-term actions to avert situations that threaten to escalate into violence; and relatively long-term actions to address ongoing tensions and/or underlying factors contributing to conflict. IPPP has engaged in both modes.

### ***Provide Small Amounts of Funding or other Resources to Catalyze Action***

One of the clear benefits of the IPPP “model” is its ability to respond quickly with a range of resources. These include the following modes:

- Providing funding for a specific activity. This is typically in cooperation with a government entity, a local NGO, or other types of organization, such as a youth association, women’s network, or union group.
- Offering technical assistance—advice, consultation, or assessment by an external expert. IPPP is able to locate consultants with specific expertise useful to local partners. These have included experts in the security sector, conflict resolution systems, journalism, and small business development.
- Convening meetings and dialogues among key groups of people. From the beginning of the project, IPPP has brought important groups of people together, often including representatives of civil society, government entities, the military, the private sector, and religious leaders. At times, such activities have been undertaken in cooperation with partner organizations, while at others, IPPP has been the sole convener. Examples include the Citizens Good Will Task Force in 2005, the group brought together to develop the National Action Plan in 2006 and the convening of a group in 2007 to develop the concept of a National Reconciliation Commission in cooperation with ECOWAS.

Of course, the mode chosen depends on the specific needs in the situation. In some cases, IPPP gives focused attention and assistance over time, while in other cases IPPP undertakes a single short-term intervention. Appendix C provides a reasonably complete list of the various IPPP interventions since the beginning of the project in 2004.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The CDA team is aware that some activities are missing from the list, which was compiled from a careful reading of project documents and the 2007 case study.

### ***Intervene at Track 1 and Track 2 Levels***

Unlike many interventions by non-governmental organizations in other settings, the IPPP works directly with government entities in Guinea-Bissau, including the military, parliamentarians, various government ministers, and even the President and Prime Minister. In contrast, most NGOs work primarily at the Track 2 level with non-official actors, influentials, intellectuals, and civil society entities. IPPP also engages with such Track 2 groups, but has been criticized for neglecting its civil society/NGO colleagues, as it has, during some periods, focused mainly on official actors. Some events have included people from government administration, the military and civil society.

IPPP has organized a number of events that were open and the results distributed fairly widely, such as the workshop for developing the National Action Plan in early 2006. Staff and consultants have also engaged in an ongoing process of quiet diplomacy, which, by its very nature, remains behind the scenes. This work requires careful cultivation of contacts and building of relationships of trust. Over the years, IPPP has gained the confidence of several key leaders in government and military circles.

### ***Link to the International Community and Advocate for Action by Other Entities***

In addition to its work inside the country, IPPP has advocated for funding or action by bilateral donors and UN bodies in relation to Guinea-Bissau. For instance, IPPP staff have provided testimony to the UN Peacebuilding Commission and consulted with DFID regarding funding for security sector reform.



### **Shifts Over Time in Strategy and Focus of IPPP**

IPPP has organized its efforts in Guinea-Bissau around dialogue, technical assistance, advocacy, and funding activities. Since it initiated grant-making activities in early 2005, IPPP has distributed \$121,288 to civil society groups (54%), media organizations (29%), and the military (17%). About half of IPPP grants have supported peacebuilding activities, including national dialogue and reconciliation processes, and the remainder of the funding has promoted journalist trainings (20%), peaceful elections (16%), and economic development (12%).

IPPP conducted scouting trips in late 2004 and it disbursed its first grant in April 2005. Recognizing the need to promote peaceful presidential elections in 2005, IPPP facilitated the founding of the Citizens' Good Will Task Force (CGWTF) and channeled \$25,400 in grants through this new civil society organization from April through July. Based on a request from CGWTF, IPPP also convened legal experts who submitted to the Supreme Court an independent legal opinion regarding the status of a document signed by one of the candidates for president. The document, if found valid as argued by the experts, would have restricted his political activities in Guinea-Bissau.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the contested candidates could run in the election.




The first round of voting was held in June, and a run-off election was conducted in July. IPPP provided a grant of \$6,000 for the CGWTF to develop an Electoral Code of Conduct that encouraged presidential candidates to run issue-based campaigns and refrain from inciting ethnic divisions. CGWTF also launched a broad public campaign for a violence-free election, including radio ads, banners, T-shirts and considerable individual and organizational efforts throughout the country. With a grant of \$10,000, the CGWTF also funded transportation and lodging for local journalists to promote independent coverage of the run-off election. (Due to insufficient wages, journalists normally had to depend on candidates to cover their travel expenses).

Furthermore, in June 2005, IPPP initiated its support of the military in Guinea-Bissau and provided a \$1,000 grant to Gen. Tagmé, the Chief of Staff, to assist in improving soldiers' inadequate living quarters. IPPP offered the military an additional \$9,000 in funding for this purpose; however, Gen. Tagmé and IPPP did not finalize the agreement, and IPPP has not disbursed this additional amount.

After a period of inactivity following the June/July 2005 presidential election, IPPP more than doubled its total funding in 2006 with a strong focus on coordination, dialogue, and economic development. In February 2006, IPPP co-organized the National Action Plan (NAP) Conference with ECOWAS. As discussed above, IPPP brought together twenty representatives from the government, military, and civil society to identify the root causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau and to brainstorm activities to address them. The NAP process informed IPPP's funding decisions during 2006. IPPP provided the NGO umbrella organization, PLACON, with \$16,000 from April through December to manage the administration of grants to other local organizations. However, IPPP staff members made funding decisions independently of PLACON in coordination with local advisors like Josué Almeida of CGWTF, who received a salary for his work with IPPP.

In mid-2006, IPPP supplied Estados Gerais, a new civil society group, with \$15,000 to conduct a national dialogue process with the goal of engaging a broad range of citizens from across the country in a discussion on stabilizing the state. IPPP also provided modest funding to the National Youth Commission (CNJ) for a national youth dialogue.



IPPP Total Grants by Year  
January 2005 – March 2008

Looking ahead to a donor conference planned for November 2006, IPPP contributed \$10,000 toward the production of the National Security Strategy Paper for government representatives to utilize in discussions with donors. Moreover, IPPP funded its first workshop on conflict reporting, conducted by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), for SINJOTECS, the journalists' union. In the second half of 2006, IPPP shifted the focus of its programming to economic development. In July, it commissioned a study analyzing the feasibility of small business incubator programs in Guinea-Bissau, and in December, IPPP funded a conference on rice and cashew production and processing that PLACON organized and an agricultural trade fair that the Chamber of Commerce coordinated.

During the first six months of 2007, IPPP's grants related primarily to reconciliation activities. It contributed \$10,000 to the military's effort to lead reconciliation meetings

around the country following the assassination in January of Mohamed Sanha, a former Navy Commander. The Military Reconciliation Committee traveled to provincial outposts to assure citizens and soldiers stationed throughout Guinea-Bissau that the military would remain united and would not interfere in national politics as it had in the past. Moreover, IPPP and ECOWAS invited political, military, civil society, and religious leaders to participate in meetings on national reconciliation in March and June 2007. During these meetings, the participants agreed to initiate a National Reconciliation Commission, which is still in the planning stages.

IPPP distributed an additional grant to the Chamber of Commerce in early 2007 to fund a Labor Roster to match skilled young adults with employment opportunities. IPPP also continued its support of journalists with two trainings in the first half 2007 on conflict reporting and investigative journalism. IPPP did not distribute any grants in the second half of the year. So far in 2008, IPPP has continued to fund training for journalists, including a follow-up workshop on investigative journalism.

IPPP's grant-making peaked in 2006, when the project distributed more than twice as much as it did in either 2005 or 2007. Interestingly, IPPP has generally conducted activities much more intensely in the first six months of each calendar year than in the latter half. However, IPPP's grants do seem to follow a pattern of quickly reacting to needs identified by local partners, such as the funding of presidential election activities in 2005, the National Security Strategy Paper development in 2006, and the military reconciliation tour in 2007.

Section V of this report will reflect on how the activities described above correspond to an analysis of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau presented in Section IV.

## IV. Analysis of the Conflict in Guinea-Bissau

This section will present a conflict analysis based on information gathered through the field interviews. This analysis of conflict in Guinea-Bissau will serve as one basis for assessing the Relevance, Effectiveness and Impacts of the IPPP activities in the next Section, where we apply the OECD DAC Criteria for the evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs.

### A Systems Analysis of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau

In order to consider the first criterion concerning the Relevance/Appropriateness (the first DAC Criterion) of the program and its Impacts (another DAC Criterion), it is necessary to understand the conflict itself. More particularly, it is important to analyze the key driving factors of conflict, particularly those factors that contribute to the potential for violence.

We cannot pretend, through a series of interviews in the field and by reading a range of analytical articles, to have developed a comprehensive understanding of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. In fact, many observers remark that Guinea-Bissau represents a challenge for anyone to comprehend—including local people living in the situation.


In almost all of the field interviews, the program review team asked: “What are the fundamental causes of conflict and how has the situation changed over recent years?” By compiling the information gained in this way, we were able to piece together a composite picture of the situation. We were also able to validate this emerging picture with several people during our final days in the country.

Figure 1 presents a systems “map” of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. This method views conflicts as dynamic systems of interacting factors and actors. Generally, a systems analysis of conflict builds on other methods for identifying the important elements, but takes a further step by showing the interactions among the elements.<sup>16</sup>


At the center of the diagram in Figure 1 is the “elite power struggle,” which most informants considered to be the most important issue in Guinea-Bissau’s political life and the most significant contributor to instability and violence. This central dynamic is characterized by constant machinations either to gain power or to maintain it, in many cases pursued through implicating elements of the armed forces. Because there are few options for employment beyond the public sector (administration and armed forces), the stakes for government power are quite high. This dynamic is explained in greater detail and mapped more fully in Figure 2.

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<sup>16</sup> The numbers, marked in small circles (such as ①), and the associated colors refer to a series of sub-systems described below.



**Figure 1:  
Conflict Analysis of Guinea-Bissau**



**Figure 2:  
Big Man Patronage System & the Struggle for Power**

Before explaining the overall systems map, it is important to discuss in greater depth the central factor of the “elite power struggle” in Figure 1. The elite power struggle is centered on personalities and personal gain, rather than important policy questions or competing visions regarding the future of the country. Political parties and their factions are organized around individuals and represent very little beyond a platform for the acquisition of power. The various politicians seek allies in military factions—which in turn intervene in various explicit/visible or more subtle/less visible ways. The 1998-99 civil war in Guinea-Bissau was essentially an extreme form of competition among political actors, each of them allied with different elements of the armed forces. By all reports, those factions (and new permutations) still exist, despite recent fairly successful efforts to build greater unity and reconciliation within the armed forces under the leadership of General Tagmé Na Wai, the dynamic Chief of Staff.

The “Big Man Patronage System,” presented in detail in Figure 2, is an archetypal dynamic that can be found in many post-colonial situations in Africa. Interviewees in Bissau and Dakar confirmed that this dynamic cycle represents an accurate description of the elite power struggles in Guinea-Bissau and many other African countries.


Tragically, the primary source of the dynamic is found in the positive impulses and social imperatives of mutual interdependence that are built into traditional survival mechanisms, especially in rural subsistence life. People who have slightly or significantly more resources or power (through position, job, or other advantages) are expected to take care of those less fortunate in the immediate and extended family, clan, ethnic group and friendship circles. One African colleague estimated that each African who holds a relatively well-paid job is expected to support as many as fifty others! This becomes a pervasive, though often unconscious, model regarding the way things work at all levels: family, village, organization, government ministry, etc. Each person looks within his/her wider circle of connections for a patron who can provide regular support or help find a job or another advantage—and each person of privilege considers it natural that such people will look to them for support, and they offer their allegiance in return.

While this system functions well and has significant value as a survival mechanism in traditional rural life, it becomes problematic in the context of a modern state, especially one in which the private sector is undeveloped, and the state is the primary source of employment and access to other resources. Holding onto governing power becomes a matter of survival for a large number of people brought into the public sector through patronage—often called nepotism or favoritism.


The transfer of power from one set of power brokers associated with a “Big Man” (or, rarely, “Big Woman”) to another thus becomes extraordinarily difficult. This high-stakes power struggle generates an elevated potential for violence, as people seek to protect their livelihoods or to gain their share of the scarce resources of a fragile state. Where people have been systematically excluded from power or access to resources based on ethnicity, race, religion, geography, or any other factor of difference, the stakes are further magnified and the potential for violence further exacerbated.

The archetypal dynamic shown in Figure 2 lies behind/within the elite power struggle in Guinea-Bissau depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1 also shows how other elements contribute to the power struggle—and its effects. The larger “map” in Figure 1 can be broken down into a series of four interlocking vicious cycles in which the elements reinforce each other, each labeled for ease of reference.

The elite power struggle already described is associated with past and present factionalism and alliances with elements of the armed forces, which contribute to instability. This cycle is labeled as ①. Factionalism itself contributes to policies and practices of exclusion, which exacerbate interethnic tensions and add to the high stakes power struggle among the elite and increase the likelihood of violence. Many perceive that one ethnic group has dominated political life and controls the armed forces. (The dark blue arrows indicate the primary cycle, and the other arrows and colors are secondary dynamics and effects.)



At the same time, elite groups have little incentive to develop a strong and independent judicial system, as that would limit their ability to distribute or expropriate resources (jobs, funds, etc.). Thus, impunity at all levels, from petty criminality to major malfeasance and abuse of office, is rampant, leading to unbridled corruption. This, in turn, makes the country vulnerable to drug trafficking, an important additional element of instability. This set of dynamics is labeled ② on the larger map. (The purple arrows indicate the primary cycle, and the other arrows and colors are secondary dynamics and effects.)




The conflict system also has two sets of dynamics in the economic realm. First, instability and insecurity contribute to a low level of investment and an almost non-existent private sector, which then provides few alternatives to public sector employment, which is itself a contributor to

the high-stakes elite struggle for power as noted above. Skilled and unskilled youth (particularly if they are not of the dominant ethnic group) are unable to find employment. Their frustrated personal goals make them vulnerable to politicians and military factions that seek to manipulate them, yet another contributing factor to instability. This cycle is labeled ③, which is the outermost circle in the system.



At the same time, the undeveloped private sector fails to invest in processing the main export crop (cashews) or diversifying agricultural production, and it generates scant government tax revenues, leading to poor delivery of basic services and dependence on foreign aid. Ironically, dependence on foreign aid appears to be inducing some positive change on the part of the current government of Guinea-Bissau, as the international community insists on progress towards basic standards of human rights, non-interference by the military, security sector reform, development of the rule of law, and so forth. This is cycle ④ on that larger map.



### Comparison with IPPP Analyses

IPPP’s formal analysis, produced during the National Action Plan workshop in 2006 identified eight root causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau, as described in Section II (page 5). Four of those eight factors correspond more-or-less with elements of the conflict analysis presented above: crisis in the state (#1); manipulation of national security and defense forces for political means (#5); lack of favorable climate for business and investment (#6); and struggle for power (#8). In addition, mistrust in win-win dialogue (#4) and increase of non-conciliatory interest groups (#7) can be seen as elements of the elite struggle for power, the central factor in Figure 1.

In our discussions in the field, we heard less discussion about the lack of qualified human resources (#2), but people spoke about the lack of opportunities for young people who have appropriate training. In fact, both factors might be true—as there are many unqualified people filling jobs due to their connections rather than their qualifications, while those who have appropriate skills and training are unable to find employment.

With the systems analysis of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau in mind, we will now turn to application of the DAC Criteria.

## V. Reflections on the Program

### Application of the DAC Evaluation Criteria

As noted in the TORs, the CDA team has used the DAC Criteria for the evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming as a primary point of reference for assessing the IPPP. The following section will discuss each of the DAC criteria in turn. This section will close with a brief listing of the strengths and weaknesses of the program, as identified by interviewees.

#### 1. **Relevance and appropriateness: *Does the effort address key driving factors of conflict that constitute elements likely to lead to political violence? How?***

In order to assess the relevance and appropriateness of the IPPP efforts in Guinea-Bissau, we refer back to the conflict analysis presented in Section IV. When IPPP arrived in Guinea-Bissau for the first assessment mission in late 2004, the long-term conflict dynamics described in Section IV were being manifested in specific urgent ways associated with shorter term political and economic factors. Specifically, the Chief of the Armed Forces had been assassinated just before the assessment team arrived in the country, leading to riots and fighting in the streets, while various military factions were backing one political figure or another. The economy was in total disarray. Many government civil servants and military units had not been paid in many months. An election was planned within the year, amidst sharp controversy regarding who was eligible to run, including former presidents who had been deposed and forced into exile. In this situation, IPPP focused on crisis management efforts, with particular attention to the military situation and the impending elections, as noted already among the contributions of the program. In the short term, these were quite relevant actions.

As the situation calmed considerably towards the end of 2005, IPPP turned to consideration of a broader program of action, based primarily in the National Action Plan developed by the multi-stakeholder group in February of 2006. Unfortunately, the NAP was so broad and diffuse that some of the precision of the previous period was lost. Nonetheless, IPPP was able to move forward on a series of efforts during 2006 and 2007 aimed at youth, security sector reform and reconciliation within the military, dialogue processes, business development, and continued support to journalists. In addition, IPPP supported development of the National Reconciliation Commission, in cooperation with ECOWAS. Each of these elements can be seen to address one or more of the key factors of conflict noted in Figure 1. Although these later efforts have not had the dramatic and immediate impacts that the earlier crisis management interventions had, they have drawn attention to some of the most important issues in Guinea-Bissau.

It would be a mistake to suggest that every effort like IPPP should address *all* important conflict factors—because they really cannot and should not. IPPP itself stresses that it is not a broad conflict resolution program; rather, its priorities must focus on the conflict factors most likely to lead to violence. This, again, suggests that priorities must be set among the many possible programmatic initiatives.

Some important factors have been relatively neglected in the situation. At a minimum, IPPP can help bring these to the attention of donors and other influential bodies, such as the UN

Peacebuilding Commission. IPPP has made some modest efforts to address key economic factors, but is really only in a position to catalyze actions by others, as it is not a development agency. Clearly this is an area of ongoing concern, particularly with regard to employment options for demobilized soldiers and the vast youth unemployment problem.

Similarly, IPPP is not in a position to provide expertise or funding for institutional development of the judicial, police, and criminal justice sectors, yet this is an urgent need. The issues regarding the justice system deserve ongoing research and advocacy, which are within IPPP's scope and capability. (Indeed, the three-year plan calls for a focus on these issues during September 2008 – August 2009.)

IPPP has also supported the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission, which has been approved by Parliament. The Commission is supposed to focus on twenty-four specific incidents that require reconciliation. While this may address some important elements of recent history, it is not clear how these incidents will influence interpersonal/inter-factional damages that continue to distort the political process at the elite level. The analysis presented in Figure 1 does show an element of unresolved history associated with the factor of factionalism. It is not clear that the NRC will be able to address the most serious of these political tensions within its current mandate.

Finally, as already noted, at the heart of the problem lies the “Big Man” patronage model that pervades all aspects of society in Guinea-Bissau. Obviously, this is a long-term issue that will not change quickly and represents a challenge encountered throughout post-colonial Africa. However, the IPPP team might explore ways to address some of its constituent parts, such as hiring based on merit and accountability for performance in government jobs.

In summary then, IPPP's efforts have been highly relevant and appropriate, while not attempting, quite rightly, to address all important elements of the conflict.

## **2. Effectiveness: *To what extent did the program achieve its stated goals?***

CIIAN has stated the IPPP mission as follows:

The mission of the IPPP - Guinea Bissau is to prevent violence by working towards peace and prosperity using a rigorous conflict analysis of specific conditions and capacities on the ground; by playing a value-added, catalytic role in assisting Guinea-Bissau's citizens and international actors to implement concrete and synergistic actions through dialogue and focused actions; by providing a small grants program to stimulate security and development initiatives; and by undertaking global advocacy to mobilize international resources.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Statement on the CIIAN website at <http://www.ciian.org/projects1.shtml#gb>

CIAN also considers that IPPP plays several roles in Guinea-Bissau.

“Incorporating lessons learned the IPPP described itself as:

- a catalyst dedicated to prevention with a multi-service, multi-sectoral approach;
- an elicitor of solutions;
- a supporter of local leadership;
- a facilitator of collaboration; and
- a champion to attract resources.”<sup>18</sup>

In addition, the three-year plan for the IPPP-Guinea-Bissau<sup>19</sup> contains “Key Themes” and “Key Elements” with different emphases during different years, as follows:

Key Themes:

- Strengthening Stability (September 2007 – August 2008)
- National Reconciliation (September 2008 – August 2009)
- Peace and Prosperity (violence prevention mission accomplished?) (September 2009 – August 2010)

Key Elements:

- Indicator-based violence prevention (ongoing)
- Crisis management/peaceful election (2007-2008)
- National reconciliation (2007-2010)
- Security sector reform/demobilization, disarmament, reintegration (2007-2008)
- Deepening rule of law (2008-2009)
- Economic development (2008-2010)

Within each of these Key Elements, CIAN has outlined a series of activities, with much more detail for the earlier periods than the later stages, understandably. In various places, CIAN has also articulated a series of procedures (“Nine Elements for Effective Action”) and several principles and practices that guide its work, such as: provide support for local leadership; focus on a catalytic role; maintain flexibility/responsiveness; pursue a holistic, multi-sectoral approach; combine advocacy, action and reflection; remain engaged, etc.<sup>20</sup>

Despite the stated mission, themes and elements, procedural guides and principles, it is nevertheless difficult to identify with any specificity the actual goals and objectives of the program. There is a gap between the broadly stated mission and identification of areas of concern (reconciliation, economic revitalization, etc.) and any more specific objectives. In other words, within the area of crisis management or national reconciliation, there are no stated objectives, only a list of possible activities. Thus it is difficult to know if IPPP has achieved its goals/objectives, as these are not stated. It is also difficult to identify the Theory/Theories of Change behind much of the IPPP activities—in other words, how the listed activities or those undertaken in the past are expected to reduce violence.

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<sup>18</sup> “Preventing Political Violence: Towards a Model for Catalytic Action, Lessons Learned from Guinea-Bissau.” CIAN, 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Three-Year Plan & Budget for the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau (September 1, 2007 – August 31, 2010),” CIAN, 2007.

<sup>20</sup> These are outlined in “Preventing Political Violence” (*op cit.*)

Despite the lack of specificity with regard to goals/objectives, we can ask whether IPPP has achieved its overall goal of reducing violence or the potential for violence in the country—and to what extent any such reduction can be attributed to the efforts of IPPP. Many local observers, partners and participants consider that IPPP has contributed to the reduction of the threat of violence in the country, especially during the run-up to the election in 2005, through interventions with regard to the role of the military and SSR, support to the Citizen’s Goodwill Task Force and journalists, as well as initiation of efforts for reconciliation within the military and more broadly. While several of those interviewed felt that a shift to addressing economic issues was appropriate, so far IPPP’s contributions in this realm have been modest. (These elements are discussed in more detail in the Impact section below.)

CIIAN has the stated intention of developing a system for tracking a series of indicators that are seen as linked to violence prevention. In fact, they have developed a draft paper outlining these indicators.<sup>21</sup> Apparently this monitoring system has not been developed further. We would also note that the indicators in the draft are quite broad and at a macro level—not tied in any direct way to IPPP’s programming. We would suggest that IPPP/CIIAN identify its goals and objectives with more precision, including clear indication of the changes it seeks to induce. Based on such goals/objectives, it will be possible to identify appropriate indicators linked more directly to IPPP’s activities.

**3. Efficiency: *Did the intervention deliver its outputs and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)?***

The IPPP has been operating on approximately \$300,000 each year. One of its major strategies is to catalyze larger actions by providing small grants to get something moving in a key area, offering technical assistance, and organizing rather modest dialogue efforts. Considering the reasonably-sized overall budget (neither small/underfunded nor grossly over-resourced) and the quite small injections of cash, the IPPP program must be considered quite efficient.

**4. Impact: *What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort?***

The classic elements of impact are expressed in the “results chain” from *inputs* to *outputs* to *outcomes* to *impacts*. Many evaluators contend that it is not possible to measure the impacts of peacebuilding programs (including violence prevention efforts)—and that one must be content with consideration of relatively immediate outcomes (the direct effects of program activities on participants). The DAC definition of impacts cited above suggests that we can look at a whole range of effects from the immediate to the long-term. At CDA, we have also been challenging the peacebuilding field to ask about impacts on “Peace Writ Large,” the broader societal level peace, beyond modest effects at the micro level. Given its overall mission, IPPP had ambitions to achieve impacts at the societal level. Therefore, it is important to assess impacts as much as we can.

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<sup>21</sup> “Judging When Prevention Is Successful: Indicators for Measuring Changes in the Causes of Conflict,” International Peace and Prosperity Project (January 2008). This is a draft document, and the CDA team did not review later versions.

We have already addressed some aspects of impact in the discussion above regarding relevance. Our basic conclusion is that the program has had considerable short-term impact in operational prevention, largely through its catalytic actions and leveraging of local leadership.

The program is in the process of shifting from a crisis management mode to addressing longer term structural issues (in the economy, governance, rule of law), in which it is more difficult to observe immediate impacts and there are many more actors. Nonetheless, if the program develops more precise goals and objectives, it should also become easier to identify impacts in the short and medium term and project these into the longer term.

### ***Major Contributions of IPPP to Violence Prevention in Guinea-Bissau***

The CDA team asked almost all interviewees what they thought the main contributions of the IPPP have been. The following represent the elements mentioned most often in those interviews:

1. ***Support to the Citizens Good Will Task Force and to journalists during the 2005 elections.*** IPPP helped form and provided funding to the CGWTF and assistance to journalists that improved media coverage. The CGWTF is credited with developing and monitoring a code of conduct for the political parties and candidates. A small amount of assistance to journalists allowed them to travel to cover the election without depending on candidates for travel, food, and lodging outside of Bissau. Both of these urgent actions are seen as having contributed to an election relatively free from violence and intimidation.
2. ***Getting the Security Sector Reform process off the blocks.*** With a small amount of funding, IPPP helped a military group to complete an important report regarding security sector reform—a process that had been stalled due to lack of funds. With the completion of this report, the donor community was able to start considering how to assist with a full SSR program—a key ingredient in the conflict.
3. ***Initiating the National Reconciliation Commission with ECOWAS.*** Guinea-Bissau suffered a major civil war barely ten years ago—and the wounds from that have not healed. IPPP recognized that the country needed a process for addressing the persisting issues, and worked with ECOWAS to bring together a group of people to consider how to proceed. That group outlined the essential elements of a proposed National Reconciliation Commission—which was subsequently approved by the National Assembly, with some modifications. IPPP is continuing to support this process, particularly with technical assistance regarding the experiences of other countries in reconciliation processes. As the NRC is still in formation, it is too soon to know what the effects will be.
4. ***Supporting the military reconciliation process and civil-military dialogue.*** IPPP provided modest funding for the military reconciliation process—mainly funding that enabled the military commission to travel around the country to provide briefings and dialogues with widely scattered military units. The military reconciliation commission carried a message of unity within the armed forces. At least by the military's own reports, this is having an effect on attitudes and behaviors within the ranks. It would be interesting to consider how IPPP might gain confirming information about perceptions inside and outside the military regarding this change process.

5. **Ongoing support to journalists.** Following its support to journalists during the 2005 elections, IPPP has continued to work with the journalists' union, SINJOTECS, sponsoring workshops from Search for Common Ground on conflict reporting and Réseau Liberté on investigative journalism. This continuing support is seen as contributing to the development of a more independent media.

### ***The Challenge of Attribution: What has changed and why?***

As noted above, IPPP has made significant contributions to conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau. We have also discussed how the situation has changed since 2004 when the project started, with most observers asserting that conditions have gotten better, especially in terms of expanded space for criticism and dialogue, greater security and less fear of military intervention, and increased economic activity. Generally, interviewees attributed these changes to the following influences:

1. International community/donor pressures;
2. Development of civil society voices/increased accountability;
3. Reform and reconciliation within the military; and
4. An atmosphere more conducive to trade and small commerce

One might ask, therefore: Which of these are associated with IPPP actions? How much "credit" can the project take? How much would have happened anyway? Clearly IPPP was not the only actor in any of these domains, as international donors have funded multiple efforts, many civil society organizations have been striving to achieve change, and the UN itself has undertaken programmes and funding, working mainly through government partners. But the IPPP has contributed to progress, particularly in relation to civil society voices and reform within the military. Through its advocacy work, IPPP had some effect on donors and donor priorities and has helped focus attention on some economic issues, although its real impact in the economic sphere is probably minimal.

5. **Sustainability:** *Are the processes, structures and mechanisms conducted or promoted by the program likely to continue after direct involvement ends? To what extent were they locally-driven and how did they build upon existing social capital and in keeping with local culture?*

One way to think about this criterion is to ask: "If IPPP closed down operations tomorrow, what would be left behind?" In some ways, it would cause barely a ripple or comment on the local scene, partly because the IPPP team deliberately keeps a low profile and has no ongoing local presence. Of course, there is a circle of close partners, particularly the members of the Citizens Goodwill Task Force, who would notice and regret the departure of IPPP. On the positive side, IPPP has not created any dependency, relying, rather, on small actions that have avoided generating unrealistic expectations or unsustainable programming.

On the other hand (and as noted elsewhere in this report), no one in Guinea-Bissau "owns" the violence prevention agenda, particularly not at an organizational level. Various individuals have been "converted" to the concept of conflict prevention and will most likely continue a range of activities that will, if successful over time, reduce the potential for widespread violence. So far, there is no shared understanding among a significant group of people of what violence

prevention means in Guinea-Bissau or what the specific elements might be of a comprehensive plan to reduce the vulnerability to violence. Nor is there the organizational capacity for undertaking a sustained set of linked efforts all aimed at reducing the likelihood of violence in the country. Thus despite the real contributions of IPPP, it is not clear that the progress the program has helped catalyze will be sustained.

**6. *Linkages: How are program efforts linked to higher/lower levels (community, national, regional) and to parallel efforts in other sectors/domains (across sectors)? How do country-level initiatives account for regional or international dimensions of the conflict?***

IPPP has done well at integrating approaches to official actors (Track 1) and civil society (Track 2), including some activities that engaged both groups, such as the National Action Plan process in 2006 and the dialogue regarding the formation of a National Reconciliation Commission in 2007. The work on the National Reconciliation Commission was done in partnership with ECOWAS, which supported the involvement of a regional actor. To our knowledge, IPPP has not attempted to connect with grassroots work (Track 3). In our view, this is entirely appropriate, since the analysis regarding the nature of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau shows that the main drivers are among the elite political class. Grassroots work would be a distraction.

IPPP has worked in a range of sectors and issues: military/DDR/SSR, civil society strengthening, economic development, media development, election monitoring, youth, etc. Our impression is that much of this work is done with separate partners, and that IPPP has not attempted to bring people together across the different groups/sectors to promote stronger linkages and synergies.

Some of those interviewed praised IPPP's independence and relative neutrality—a rare commodity in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, others criticized IPPP for working in a fairly isolated manner, without taking notice of what others are doing. Some civil society leaders also felt that IPPP had worked more closely with government entities than with NGOs and had not done enough to communicate regularly with all stakeholders.

**7. *Consistency with Peacebuilding Values: What are the means (methods, approach, values, assumptions) of the intervention, and how are these consistent with peacebuilding ends? How do implementation personnel demonstrate sensitivity to others, lack of bias in their judgments, and respect for people with different opinions or approaches? In what ways does the intervention show conflict-sensitivity?***

We have already noted the strong value-base of the project—which is further discussed in Section VII: Lessons Learned. So far as we could tell, IPPP has not inadvertently exacerbated conflict in the country, and all staff and consultants have acted with integrity and respect.

### **Strengths and Weaknesses of the IPPP**

In addition to inquiring about the contributions of the program, the CDA team asked interviewees for their views regarding the strengths of the program and any weaknesses or areas for improvement. The following is a brief summary of the main points:

### ***Strengths***

- The program has provided quick funding to provide impetus for important initiatives or move things that are stuck.
- IPPP has organized dialogue processes and modeled multi-stakeholder interactions.
- It has made small pushes on specific economic questions (incubator study, cashew production, trade fair, and youth roster).
- IPPP grants have, on occasion, catalyzed funding from other sources.
- The program has worked across different levels/sectors: it is nimble and flexible.
- IPPP staff maintain remarkable access to government officials.
- The program has put Guinea-Bissau on the map through various forms of advocacy.
- Technical assistance providers from outside of Guinea-Bissau (like Search for Common Ground) have been identified and brought in.

### ***Weaknesses/Areas for Improvement***

- IPPP lacks a consistent presence in the country—which makes follow through difficult at times.
- The “flip side” of flexibility/nimbleness is that the program can appear to be scattered, inconsistent, and it is difficult to maintain relationships as the focus shifts.
- Communication with partners has not been consistent, particularly with civil society and NGO groups.
- Some civil society groups feel that they have been abandoned without sufficient explanation.
- There are a number of “loose ends”—initiatives that were started and have not been followed through.
- Some organizations that IPPP has supported with rapid small grants also require long-term funding and have specific technical assistance needs.
- IPPP has generally reacted to crisis or near-crisis situations, rather than proactively building the capacity of local institutions to anticipate and mitigate potential conflict situations before they intensify.

## **VI. Recommendations**

### **1. Develop Specific Goals and Objectives**

As noted in the previous section, while IPPP has an overall mission and has identified key themes, key elements and a series of planned activities, it has not articulated specific goals or objectives within those themes and elements. The program would be strengthened by stating goals and objectives within a clear overall strategy for change.

Although we have doubts about the full results-based management package (or, more precisely, how it is implemented), nevertheless, in the experience of RPP, peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs do need to be clear about the changes they are promoting, as specifically as possible. These desired changes are usually stated in the program's goals/objectives. Without goals/objectives, it is difficult to designate appropriate indicators, except at a macro level far removed from IPPP program interventions. In the process of developing more specific goals and objectives, IPPP would be well served by identifying explicitly the Theories of Change that lie behind the strategies and activities chosen.

### **2. Reconsider the Staffing Model**

From the beginning of the IPPP in 2004 until the present, the initiative has functioned with no permanent staff present in Guinea-Bissau. For a brief period, there was a local coordinator, but that experiment was not particularly successful. IPPP depends, therefore, on the periodic visits by CIAN staff and consultants, and the ongoing interest of a consistent core of local leaders and partners. As noted above, IPPP has accomplished a lot using this model. As also noted, IPPP is criticized for not maintaining a presence in the country, for a somewhat scattered program, and for various loose ends of things started but not finished.

It may be time to take another look at the fundamental approach to staffing—not because it failed in the past—but because conditions have changed and the kinds of efforts needed may require more consistent presence in the country, particularly as IPPP shifts from short-term and urgent situations to planning for longer term contributions to violence prevention. The decision regarding whether to appoint someone (expatriate or local) to coordinate IPPP programming should depend on the nature of the programs themselves and what they require. Nevertheless, IPPP seems to suffer from the same dynamic of many international efforts that do not maintain an ongoing presence: activities pick up, people attend events, plans get made with great enthusiasm, but then, as soon as the international partners leave, local people go back to their busy lives, and plans made are seldom implemented—until the next visit from outside.

An important principle of IPPP is to provide support to local leadership. But if local leaders are so busy that they are not able to do the work that is needed or to follow through on mutual commitments, it may be that an important form of support would be to establish an ongoing programmatic presence, either by a qualified local or international person.

IPPP/CIAN has developed a three-year plan. It would be useful to look at each major component of that plan, asking how best to ensure implementation—and whether some form of ongoing local presence would move things along more quickly.

### 3. Develop a Common Understanding and Overall Approach to Conflict Prevention

IPPP made efforts earlier in the program to develop a conflict analysis—with only modest results, as already noted. In the view of the CDA team, it is now time to return to this kind of endeavor—seeing it partly as a capacity building or training effort. The analysis achieved in 2006 was more of a laundry list of national needs than a deeper analysis of conflict dynamics. The people we interviewed all had perspectives on the conflict—and seemed genuinely interested in understanding it better in order to prevent violence. This may be an opportune time for conducting another more profound analysis process, focusing on building the skills of local people for performing their own analyses in the future—and also making the analysis process an ongoing effort, in which participants learn skills of conflict analysis, use them immediately, and then revisit the analysis regularly to note any important changes.

An analysis—particularly a *shared* analysis—of the conflicts and the connections to potential violence is only a first step. Participants in an analysis process can also be engaged in developing an overall approach to conflict prevention—a plan that they would generate and feel an ongoing connection to. This kind of process could also be related to development of a local advisory group.

### 4. Address the Conflict Sensitivity and Conflict Prevention Potential of ALL Programming in Guinea-Bissau

Particularly as a situation reaches greater stability and attention shifts to underlying conflict dynamics, it will be important to determine how a violence prevention effort can continue to catalyze actions by others better suited to long-term persistent programming. In many cases, other organizations (donors, bilateral aid programs, INGOs/NGOs, etc.) are already implementing programs that address a wide array of development goals. The violence prevention intervener (like IPPP) can make a significant contribution by helping such actors see how their existing programs can address conflict dynamics. Such adaptations will have two somewhat different objectives: 1) to ensure that *all* programs are conflict sensitive—that is that they do not inadvertently exacerbate conflict;<sup>22</sup> or 2) to determine whether and how the program can directly address key drivers of conflict. The violence prevention group can provide technical assistance to other development or humanitarian assistance actors in this regard.

### 5. Establish a Simple Mechanism for Consultation and Decision Making

No one “owns” IPPP in Guinea-Bissau. It is seen in a positive light, but as an initiative coming from the international community, in which the decisions regarding program direction, with whom to work, which issues to tackle, and even when to make a visit, are all controlled by outsiders. In the past, the Citizen’s Good Will Task Force has played a kind of “shadow” advisory role, but not officially, and not as a group. CIAN staff have consulted most regularly with the four principal members of the CGWTF and a handful of others individually, but they have reserved decision making authority for themselves. So far, this has not resulted in resentment or, with a couple of exceptions, questionable decisions. However, CIAN/IPPP should be thinking about an exit strategy—and what the benchmarks might be that would indicate that it is time to leave. One key element of an exit or devolvement strategy would be the development of a local group that at least helps with decision making.

<sup>22</sup> This is the major insight of the “Do No Harm” framework: see [www.cdainc.com](http://www.cdainc.com).

## **6. Build Capacity for Conflict Management**

Guinea-Bissau's university barely functions. Most of those with a university education studied abroad—and most likely none of them studied conflict transformation. There are, therefore, no fully qualified Guinea-Bissauan conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, or conflict transformation experts. At the same time, we are not aware of any lusophone programs in conflict transformation (indeed, even francophone programs are rare). IPPP could make an important contribution to building conflict transformation by working with other institutions (Eastern Mennonite University or one of the other universities offering short-term programs in the theory and practice of conflict transformation) to organize an annual intensive program. Such a program might rotate among Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Such programs are most effective when they are accompanied by immediate application of skills and mentoring to provide ongoing support and learning. IPPP would also be in a position to identify people in organizations already engaged in peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau—and then to follow up with them after a training program.

## **7. Attend to Loose Ends (or acknowledge dead ends...)**

Not every effort is or should be successful. Rather, a program like IPPP, which strives to be creative, responsive, and flexible, must take risks in the interests of violence prevention. Inevitably, therefore, some initiatives will fall flat, while others will flourish. In some cases, however, IPPP has let something or a partner drop without really bringing the effort to a close. Or, if it intends to come back to the issue/group at some point, it would be helpful to communicate with the people involved. We recommend that IPPP simply communicate clearly with the individuals and organizations involved.

## **8. Consider a Broader Advocacy Strategy**

The advocacy work of IPPP is fairly low key and invisible—and in some cases, this is appropriate, especially when sensitive issues are being addressed. In other cases, IPPP should consider making a more concerted effort, working in partnership with other groups engaged in Guinea-Bissau (and there are several!) and using the networks it is associated with directly or indirectly (Alliance for Peacebuilding, Peacebuild, GPPAC, etc.). Now that Guinea-Bissau has been chosen as a focus for the UN Peacebuilding Commission, joint advocacy strategies—in close cooperation with local leaders in Guinea-Bissau—are needed even more.

Guinea-Bissau's government depends heavily on development aid, and foreign governments holding politicians in Guinea-Bissau accountable has helped to reduce corruption. The country desperately needs assistance to hold transparent elections, support its reconciliation process, develop the private sector, combat drug trafficking, and build a functional justice system. While funding is crucial, the people we interviewed also consistently identified technical assistance needs as well (especially in the areas of legal reform, journalism, and job skills for youth and soldiers). IPPP should consult with bilateral and multilateral donors to share its accumulated knowledge regarding the ways that these organizations can best invest their resources to strengthen peacebuilding and economic development in Guinea-Bissau.

## 9. Strengthen Partnerships and Communication

Although the team heard considerable reflection on the IPPP program and received suggestions regarding priorities, few observers had a full picture of all that IPPP has been doing, and almost no one was aware of its future plans. Based on this scattered evidence regarding specific areas of work and the fact that most of those interviewed were able to comment only on their own area of concern, the team is not prepared to offer advice with regard to what IPPP should or should not do with respect to reconciliation or economic development or any other specific topic. We can, however, offer suggestions regarding the overall approach to partnerships with local leaders. The following are *overarching recommendations* on strengthening partnerships and communication that concern all areas of programming:

- a. Consider how longer-term relationships with local partners should function. While recipients of rapid disbursements of grants report that the funding made an impact at key intervals, many require assistance with ongoing activities. As many local partners gradually shift attention from “peace” to “prosperity,” IPPP must consider how to continue to support them.
- b. Develop brief quarterly or annual reports noting recent activities and upcoming plans that can be easily shared with partners, donors, ECOWAS, and UN officials.
- c. Independent of its efforts to develop macro indicators to assess peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau, we recommend that IPPP develop indicators of success for specific grants and activities. IPPP should actively collaborate with local partners to develop clear expectations and indicators for assessing the performance of activities. During interviews, IPPP’s partners did not refer to any monitoring or evaluation plans related to their collaboration with the project.

## 10. Develop a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan

The first element of the IPPP Three-Year Plan addresses “indicator-based violence prevention,” and an initial set of indicators has been developed.<sup>23</sup> However, as far as we could tell, there has been no follow-up from this exercise. The indicators identified are all at a macro level and do not concern elements more closely associated with IPPP initiatives. We have already suggested the development of more specific goals and objectives, which is a prerequisite to the creation of a monitoring and evaluation plan. As this is a challenging task for all peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs, we would suggest obtaining short-term technical assistance for this effort.

## 11. Produce an Exit Plan

While the IPPP is conceived as a long-term program in Guinea-Bissau, nevertheless, it does need to determine when it has achieved sufficient progress to justify withdrawal. Indeed, CIAN/IPPP’s ninth “Element for Success”<sup>24</sup> is “measure success, and agree on an exit plan.” IPPP staff did draft an exit plan several years ago,<sup>25</sup> which outlined some of the important principles and variables. It would be appropriate to take another look at that document and develop a more specific plan for withdrawal, presumably at the end of the current three-year plan.

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<sup>23</sup> “Judging When Prevention Is Successful: Indicators for Measuring Changes in the Causes of Conflict,” IPPP, January 2008.

<sup>24</sup> “Preventing Political Violence: Towards a Model for Catalytic Action, Lessons Learned from Guinea-Bissau.” CIAN, 2006.

<sup>25</sup> “Exploring Options for an IPPP Exit Strategy from Guinea-Bissau.” Evan Hoffman, IPPP, 2006.

## VII. Lessons Learned from the IPPP

The TORs for this program review ask explicitly for identification of lessons that could help inform similar programmatic efforts in other places. The IPPP is associated with the Global Crisis Prevention Mechanism (GCPM), an emerging program dedicated to promoting interventions to forestall violence. The lessons from the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau should inform subsequent efforts by GCPM and others.

### The Basic IPPP Model Works

CIIAN documents describe the basic approach of the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau in terms of “Nine Elements for Effective Action”<sup>26</sup>:

1. Identify a potential location through an early warning exercise.
2. Dispatch a multi-disciplinary team on an initial scouting trip in order to confirm country selection.
3. Obtain endorsements and partners.
4. Construct a flexible operational plan.
5. Build working relationships with local leaders through targeted activities.
6. Continue ongoing real-time analysis.
7. Facilitate a joint diagnostic and prevention action planning process.
8. Support implementation of the prevention action plan.
9. Measure success, and agree on exit plan.

This particular formulation was developed in 2006, when the National Action Plan (see #7 above) was still being used as a guide for action. Subsequently, CIIAN and the IPPP team have not relied on that document to determine priorities, but have pursued a less formal approach to analysis and decision making. As already discussed in previous sections, implementation of the model has not been entirely free of flaws, as might be expected in any program operating under uncertainties. Nevertheless, the basic model appears sound, based on the experience to date in Guinea-Bissau.

We might add that elements #4 (operational plan) and #8 (support for implementation), as undertaken in Guinea-Bissau, contain important specific actions. As we have reiterated, IPPP has worked in four modes: 1) small grants to support specific activities deemed crucial for addressing crisis situations or to get something moving that appeared to be “stuck”; 2) technical assistance and expert advice brought in from outside the country to support people attempting to make progress in key areas; 3) organization of carefully targeted dialogues across sectors and levels, including representatives of government, civil society, religious leaders, youth, women, and the business community; and 4) quiet diplomacy, building relationships and providing advice and perspectives behind the scenes with key leaders. These four modes constitute the components of the “catalytic” role that IPPP has pursued.

In practice, IPPP has included a tenth element: the important dimension of advocacy, particularly in the international community of donors, governments, and UN agencies.

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<sup>26</sup> “Preventing Political Violence: Towards a Model for Catalytic Action, Lessons Learned from Guinea-Bissau.” CIIAN, 2006.

### Adherence to Guiding Principles

The model is informed by a series of important guiding principles, which, in our view, are as important as the Nine Elements described above. Most of these are described in CIAN documents available on their website. We have presented them as a series of both “thou shalt” as well as “thou shalt nots,” because stating only the positive can miss important mistakes that should be avoided.

<b>Thou Shalt</b>	<b>Thou Shalt Not</b>
Adhere to a catalytic/stimulating role.	Get deeply involved and create dependencies.
Keep a focus and priority on violence prevention—and on activities that address proximate triggers of violence. When addressing longer term structural issues (such as economic development), mainly leverage actions by others.	Attempt to address all conflict factors or stray from a catalytic role in relation to economic development or other issues of structural prevention.
Identify and support local leadership.	Drive program initiatives from external perspectives or agendas.
Remain flexible and nimble, continually looking for strategic points of intervention.	Get stuck on a narrow set of intervention modes or assumptions.
Pursue a holistic and multi-sectoral approach	Assume that one group or sector is the most important.
Work across Track 1 (official actors) and Track 2 (influentials and civil society), as needed.	Focus just on one Track, or assume that all change comes from one or the other.

### Flexibility/Agility versus Follow-through/Persistence

One of the principles stated above calls for remaining flexible and nimble—an important concept for programs that attempt to prevent violence, since there are no clear predictors of risk for violence. In other words, while research has identified a whole set of factors that are often associated with eventual violence, it is (so far) impossible to know with certainty which ones must be addressed to avoid the outbreak of widespread social destruction. We can also see from the analysis of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau that the various risk factors are part of a dynamic conflict system. Positive or negative changes in any single factor will have effects on other factors. This suggests a need to maintain maximum flexibility—and pursue multiple initiatives simultaneously, especially during times of impending crisis or escalating violence when “operational prevention” must be the priority.

On the other hand, the underlying conflict dynamics are long-term systems that change only quite slowly. These elements are addressed through efforts at “structural prevention” that require more careful analysis, effective strategies for change over time, longer-term planning, consistent resources, and greater follow through. There is also a danger that an avowedly flexible

organization like IPPP will become drawn into efforts in support of economic development, democracy, good governance, and so forth. An organization like IPPP, while trying to remain flexible and agile, may be accused of treating serious long-term issues in a superficial manner.

### **Addressing Both Track 1 and Track 2 Work**

One of the clear strengths of the IPPP work has been the fact that they have had remarkable access to official actors—government ministers, military leaders, the Prime Minister, and other highly placed individuals. Some of this is because Guinea-Bissau is such a small society and everyone knows everyone else, particularly among the political elites. However, IPPP proceeded, from the start, on the assumption that official actors were key people for violence prevention. A strategy that ignored government or military leaders and took the easier approach of dealing only with civil society would have failed. Future intervention efforts should consider carefully the appropriate mix of initiatives in relation to government and civil society, based on an analysis of the situation and the views of local partners.

### **Ongoing Local Presence versus Multiple Visits**

Except for a brief period when IPPP had a local coordinator, it has functioned entirely on the basis of periodic trips from staff or consultants based in North America, Europe, or elsewhere in West Africa. We have already recommended that IPPP reconsider this approach, based on the implementation needs for accomplishing specific goals in the future.

We see clear advantages to the “light-on-the-ground” approach, and consider it part of the principle of flexibility. However, we are not sure that this model should be taken as a proven rule applicable to all circumstances. Rather, we would suggest that the decision regarding whether to adopt a “no-ongoing-presence” model or to establish some form of local office and/or staffing should be guided by the needs of each situation. In some cases, there will be an organization based in the country of concern that can serve as a base of operations, under a variety of different arrangements. In other cases, there may be no appropriate locally-based organization, but the severity of the crisis will demand concentrated efforts, at least for some period of time.

### **Working with Local Leaders**

IPPP has been working with an extraordinary group of local partners—both individuals and organizations, from government and from civil society. The principle of identifying and supporting such people has proven—at least in this case—to be fully justified. One can assume that every society will have courageous and creative people who are ready to lead their society towards a stable peace with greater justice. Nonetheless, the Guinea-Bissau experience suggests a number of challenges and dilemmas that should be noted:

***Dealing with Time Constraints.*** The strongest local leaders tend to be quite busy and in demand from numerous directions. In most cases, a violence prevention effort cannot assume that local leaders will have time available for additional initiatives. In some circumstances, particularly for crisis management, local partners may sense the urgency and shift their priorities—but such arrangements may not survive the crisis period.

***Building Skills.*** Local leaders will each demonstrate strengths in their own professional domains, but they may not have skills or awareness in the realm of violence prevention or conflict resolution. In most of the places where one might intervene, such skills will be rare. An important element of support for local leaders should, therefore, focus on building skills in analysis, strategy development, and program design in conflict/violence prevention.

***Developing a Common Understanding.*** In 2006, IPPP brought together a wide range of local stakeholders for a process of diagnosis, analysis, and program planning—which then served as a guide to IPPP priorities for the balance of the year. As IPPP itself acknowledges, the analysis generated was really a recounting of all of the problems and development needs of the country, rather than a true analysis of the potential sources of violence. The CDA review team found that people did each have a view of the conflict and the possible triggers of violence—but there was no shared understanding of the key issues or what to do about them, even among IPPP’s closest partners. In the experience of RPP, local people have an enormous amount of information about their society, and they often benefit from an external technical assistance provider who engages them in a dialogue about the key elements of conflict and helps them organize information into a coherent analysis.

***Creating a Common Program/Agenda.*** Developing a common analysis is only the first step towards generating a broad plan for reducing the vulnerability to widespread societal violence. Again, in 2006, IPPP worked with the stakeholder group to develop the National Action Plan, which was in active use for the balance of that year, but has fallen away since. The CDA team found that local partners had ideas regarding priorities for violence prevention in the country, but there was no shared vision that would help people to understand how a range of different initiatives might contribute to a more coherent whole. This is important for a model that stresses a multi-sectoral and holistic approach.

***Engaging Local Leaders in an Advisory Role.*** CIIAN/IPPP staff members consult with some local leaders on almost every visit to the country. In a sense, these people constitute an informal advisory group, although they do not all meet together, and some may not even be aware of who the others are. One approach to generating a stronger analysis, creating a common agenda, and encouraging greater local ownership of the violence prevention agenda would be to constitute an advisory group with a clear mandate to work with IPPP in these and other ways.

### **An Open Question: What actually prevents violence?**

We know that there have been no widespread incidents of violence in Guinea-Bissau since 2004 when IPPP began. However, we do not know, with any certainty, which actions by which actors, including IPPP, have been effective in forestalling violence. Most likely the lack of violence is the result of interactions among multiple factors and initiatives by multiple actors. We know about some of the factors and actors, and can even see the effects of IPPP’s own efforts. But what really prevents violence remains a puzzle. If the field of conflict prevention wants to become more effective, we need to understand the interactions better, in order to become more precise in our interventions.

An analysis of the conflict context in Guinea-Bissau confirms that violence arises from interactions among short-term “triggers” and deeper structures and systems. During its first stage, IPPP focused on crisis management—addressing the immediate triggers of violence. In

more recent years, the project has turned its attention to the structural factors. This approach is consistent with the widely-accepted theory in the field: that violence prevention requires a balance between short-term urgent actions and longer-term structural change. The questions persist, however: How do we figure out which triggers are the crucial ones and how do we best defuse them? Which long-term risk factors are predictive for violence and how can we make sufficient progress on them? The IPPP experience in Guinea-Bissau can reassure us that violence prevention is possible, but it does not provide conclusive answers to these persistent questions.

## **VIII. A Final Word: The IPPP as an Experiment. How is it unique?**

Those associated with IPPP have asserted that it is unique, but have also found it difficult to articulate exactly how. In many ways, IPPP's principles and major activities have all been undertaken by many other organizations. For instance:

- Support for local leadership is an accepted practice throughout the development, humanitarian and international peacebuilding fields.
- Adopting a catalytic role is at least an aspiration for many organizations. IPPP has excelled at this mode, particularly in making small strategic grants and injecting technical assistance at key moments.
- Many in the international community espouse a holistic and multi-sectoral approach—although actual practice is variable.
- It is quite common for peace and conflict organizations to work across Track 1 and Track 2, although many feel more comfortable working with civil society. Nevertheless, there is a long history of informal/nonofficial actors establishing relationships of trust and confidence across a spectrum of government, civil society, and even rebel movements and other non-state actors.
- IPPP works in four modes: small grants, technical assistance, dialogue work and quiet diplomacy. These are standard fare for most peacebuilding and conflict prevention organizations.
- Many in the broader peace field combine advocacy and action—and most make a commitment of multiple years to a country or conflict zone.

Four aspects of the IPPP approach appear a bit more unusual—in degree, if not in kind:

- IPPP bases the decision of where and whether to intervene on an analysis of available information regarding the nature of conflict and the likelihood that violence will erupt. In other words, the decision is data-driven and based on need. Many organizations are guided more by organizational expertise and previous contacts.
- IPPP has taken the idea of being flexible and nimble to a high art. While many aspire to be responsive, IPPP has the ability to mobilize financial resources incredibly quickly, largely due to its private and independent funding source. On occasion, it has also been able to provide needed technical expertise in a rapid manner.
- IPPP has maintained a clear focus on violence prevention. Other organizations typically pursue a broader agenda associated with development, humanitarian assistance or even a more expansive peace initiative.
- Relationship building—at all levels—is at the heart of the IPPP approach. While other organizations build relations as needed to get the work done, IPPP considers this as fundamental to its approach.

Possibly, the uniqueness of IPPP lies in the way that it has combined the various elements cited above, but even this does not provide a completely satisfactory answer to the uniqueness question. We would suggest that, at its heart, IPPP:

- Remains engaged but not enmeshed (in other words, it continues to be interested and intermittently present, but does not become a part of the local scene or beholden to donors, other national interests or even the international community);
- Holds no agenda apart from violence prevention, maintaining neutrality, except in opposition to violence; and
- Is remarkably free to follow immediate and longer-term needs and to deal with any/all political actors, as demanded by the situation and within its violence prevention mandate.

If one were to seek an analogy, this configuration appears much like a Special Representative of the Secretary General—but without the baggage of the UN system! While many SRSRs are effective, they are also constrained by the very official and visible nature of their positions and by the requirement that they deal directly and primarily with the government in power. The representatives of IPPP, on the other hand, are able to perform many of the same functions, but relying solely on the credibility they gain through personal interactions and their greater flexibility to engage directly and quietly with any and all stakeholders. IPPP is accountable primarily to its mission of preventing violence, rather than to a series of competing national and international interests.

While it would be tempting to assert that this is an entirely new creation, it really is not. Various Quaker envoys since the 19<sup>th</sup> century have played quite similar roles, most recently through quiet work during the Second World War, during the Nigeria-Biafra and Viet Nam wars, in Northern Ireland, in the Middle East, and in northern Uganda.<sup>27</sup> Other religious and non-religious groups have also deployed people to undertake similar missions, such as the work of John Paul Lederach and others on the Nicaraguan coast and elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> Most of those past efforts were undertaken to bring peace after violence had already broken out or to protect populations threatened by war. However, many of them also intervened to prevent the slide back into violence after a degree of stability had been achieved—a situation much like that in Guinea-Bissau, which is also still very much in a post-violence phase.

A real difference can be found, perhaps, in the effort by IPPP both to focus on violence prevention and to systematize such efforts, as reflected in the emerging Global Crisis Prevention Mechanism, created partly as a result of the IPPP experience. IPPP and its GCPM counterpart intervene to prevent violence from erupting, to preserve lives, and to avert the destruction of resources. In this respect, they have transferred the venerable concept of an independent envoy or representative more emphatically into the evolving sphere of violence prevention that holds much promise.

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<sup>27</sup> See, for instance, Curle, Adam. *True Justice: Quaker Peacemakers and Peacemaking*. London: Quaker Home Service, 1981. Bailer, Sydney D. “Non-Official Mediation in Disputes: Reflections on Quaker Experience.” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring, 1985), London: Blackwell Publishing.

<sup>28</sup> Sampson, Cynthia and Lederach, John Paul. *From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

## **Appendix A: Terms of Reference: Project Review of the International Peace & Prosperity Project in Guinea-Bissau**

### **I. Introduction**

This document presents a plan for carrying out a Project Review focused on the International Peace & Prosperity Project (IPPP) implemented in Guinea-Bissau by the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation on behalf of the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP). This plan is subject to further discussion and refinement with CIAN and AfP personnel, as well other people directly concerned. It represents the thinking, to date, of the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) team.

### **II. Background to the International Peace & Prosperity Project**

The International Peace & Prosperity Project was designed to prevent political violence in Guinea-Bissau, a country that was considered to be vulnerable to the outbreak of violent conflict. The group that conceptualized this project saw it as a test case for an emerging model for violence prevention, and designed the effort to learn lessons from this experience that would inform subsequent efforts elsewhere.

One project report describes the effort:

The IPPP features the mobilization of local leaders and the provision of professional assistance and modest financial support to carry out early, holistic, horizontally and vertically integrated violence prevention actions.

More specifically, the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau aims to prevent political violence by:

- working towards peace and prosperity using rigorous ongoing conflict and violence analyses;
- playing a value-added, catalytic role in assisting Guinea-Bissau citizens, the government, and international actors to implement concrete, synergistic actions through dialogue and focused projects;
- providing a small grants program to stimulate security and development initiatives; and
- undertaking global advocacy to mobilize international resources for violence prevention and peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau.<sup>29</sup>

While this effort was initiated by people based in the global North, the intent—as reflected in the text above—was to identify and support local capacities for violence prevention through a series of partnerships and modest financial support.

### **III. Goals, Products and Uses of the Project Review**

#### ***Goals of the Project Review***

CDA will conduct a Project Review of the IPPP with several specific goals:

1. To discern whether and how the IPPP has contributed to reducing the likelihood of political violence in Guinea-Bissau;

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<sup>29</sup> Preventing Political Violence: Towards a Model for Catalytic Action, CIAN, August 2006.

2. To suggest ways to proceed with additional IPPP engagements in Guinea-Bissau, building on past efforts, and taking into account current political dynamics; and
3. To identify preliminary lessons that could be relevant to subsequent efforts to prevent violent conflict, especially elsewhere in West Africa.<sup>30</sup>

This proposed Project Review will build on previous efforts to capture lessons and provide forward direction of the project. Specifically, an evaluation was performed in 2006, a case study was commissioned in 2007, and a lessons-learned workshop was held in 2007. The products from each of these initiatives will provide valuable information and background documentation for the proposed Project Review. CDA will make every effort to avoid duplication of earlier efforts, as well as to learn from positive and negative lessons from those processes. In particular, the case study may provide the CDA team with sufficient history and recounting of activities that they can “fast forward” to current questions. Insofar as a more complete history of what was done, when, by whom, and why could inform further analysis, CDA will work with local actors and project personnel to fill in any gaps.

### ***Uses of the Project Review***

The results of the Project Review (in the form of a report) should be of use to several constituencies.

1. Project implementer: The Project Review should be designed to be helpful to CIAN and its local partners, as they determine possible next steps for IPPP engagement in Guinea-Bissau. The review should be an opportunity for open reflection regarding overall analysis, strategies, rationales, and options for future engagement.
2. Local leaders for violence prevention: The Project Review process itself should offer an occasion for key people in Guinea-Bissau to examine the full range of efforts at violence prevention (of which IPPP is a part) and to think through their own strategies and capacities—and the most useful roles for external actors like IPPP.
3. Project holder: The Alliance for Peacebuilding can use the Project Review as part of their efforts to develop procedures for monitoring and evaluation of AfP programs and projects. These TORs will be reviewed by the AfP Program Committee to ensure that the design and methodology meet their criteria for a project review and will help the group learn, as it contemplates other such accountability measures.
4. The private donor: Milt Lauenstein has been an active and passionate advocate for violence prevention, and he has funded the IPPP in the hopes of contributing to knowledge and practical methods for intervention in emerging violent situations. As he continues funding the IPPP work and considers funding other such initiatives, he and his family are interested in learning what has proven effective and how. The Project Review will provide additional information—for comparison with other experiences elsewhere—in order to develop generalizable lessons.

## **IV. CDA Approach to the Project Review**

### **Project Review Team**

The CDA team will be led by Peter Woodrow, Co-Director of CDA’s Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP). CDA will recruit one additional team member, with all/some of the following qualifications: experience in West Africa; Portuguese language ability; knowledge of peacebuilding and

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<sup>30</sup> The proposed Global Crisis Prevention Mechanism, which involves many of the same people who helped launch the IPPP, intends to develop a second violence prevention initiative in West Africa, and is interested in incorporating lessons from the Guinea-Bissau experience.

conflict prevention concepts and methods; field experience with peacebuilding and/or development programming.

### **Issues in Project Review**

CDA, mainly through its Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP), has been working with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities regarding a broad range of issues and controversies regarding the evaluation of programs that aim to contribute to peace. To date, experience shows that it is possible, using standard methods, to evaluate the immediate *outputs* (activities performed, events held, numbers of participants engaged, etc.), against project plans. More importantly, it is possible to ascertain the proximate *outcomes* of those efforts, in terms of relatively short-term changes in behaviors, attitudes, establishment of new institutions, improvement of relationships, and so forth. The peacebuilding community as a whole is still struggling with the issue of how to measure *impacts*, on what we have called “Peace Writ Large,” or the broader societal level peace. Here, the question is, given the successful delivery of outputs and observable short-term outcomes, can we determine if these have contributed to the broader longer-term peace?

In this case, the projects activities have been documented through various reports and the recent case study. It is now over three years since the first scouting mission to Guinea-Bissau in October 2004, and sufficient time has passed to consider the direct and indirect effects of activities undertaken in the early years of the project. Thus, we will be attempting to identify how the IPPP has contributed to violence prevention over the past three years, looking at the evidence on the ground in the field and making reasonable projections regarding how seeds planted may bear fruit in the future.

It is widely acknowledged that there is a persistent problem of attribution: how can one determine whether and how one specific intervention among many had an impact? It will be quite difficult to discern, with any accuracy or credibility, whether IPPP had any decisive individual impact on violence prevention in Guinea-Bissau. However, it will be possible to identify, through a series of interviews (see below) whether and how violence was prevented in Guinea-Bissau—and to determine logically, therefore, the ways that IPPP clearly or possibly contributed.

### **Methodology**

The CDA team will rely on two main sources of information: a) face-to-face interviews with a wide range of people in Guinea-Bissau (and some outside the country, as appropriate); and b) project documents and other reports.

### ***Interviews***

In order to understand the “story” of a particular geographical setting and the programs undertaken there, CDA relies on listening closely to a wide range of people. These interviews are focused conversations, rather than the implementation of a survey or questionnaire. Such conversations are held with project staff and consultants, local leaders and officials, direct program participants, representatives of non-governmental organizations (particularly others working on peacebuilding), and informed local and international observers (such as diplomats, aid officials, UN official, academics and journalists). We endeavor to hear from the relevant categories of people: men and women, old and young, and from different political tendencies, as appropriate. The CDA team will work closely with CIAN and its local partner organizations to ensure that an appropriate mix of interviewees is included.

In our experience, no single interview is sufficient to draw conclusions; however, patterns of agreement and disagreement do emerge from multiple sources, and these add up to a more complete picture.

### **Document Review**

The CDA team will also review various documents. These include:

- IPPP documents and analyses as available, including (but not limited to) the CIIAN Three Year Plan and Budget for IPPP in Guinea-Bissau (September 2007) and “Judging when Prevention is Successful: Indicators for Measuring Changes in the Causes of Conflict” (January 2008)
- Descriptions of the initial IPPP program proposal or model and other conceptual/analytical documents (much of which is described in the 2007 case study by Angela Kachuyevski)
- Regular reports/documents from partner organizations
- Reports published by current actors in the area, particularly as these may help understand the political context
- Other written research, as available

### **Conflict Analysis**

Early in the field visit, the CDA team will develop a conflict analysis as one point of reference for the Project Review, in particular for assessing its relevance. We will discuss with CIIAN what previous conflict analyses have been produced, and how a current analysis might best be accomplished. The purpose of this process will be to provide an understanding, based on local knowledge, of the sources of ongoing conflicts in Guinea-Bissau —as a step in examining how the IPPP has addressed those issues. This exercise will also identify important changes in the context since the IPPP began.

### **Data Analysis and Preliminary Findings**

Once the interviews, document review and conflict analysis have been completed, the CDA team will identify the patterns that they see, draw lessons learned and develop recommendations. The team’s preliminary findings will be shared orally and informally with relevant partners in Guinea-Bissau and with CIIAN personnel, if they are also in Guinea-Bissau at the time.

### **Draft Report**

Upon returning to the US, the CDA team will draft a written report. This will be shared with CIIAN staff, AfP and the funder in order to gather comments, suggestions and corrections of facts.

## **V. Examination of IPPP Assumptions & Application of RPP Concepts**

In its experience with program reviews and evaluations, RPP has found several concepts and frameworks useful. These include the concept of the Theory of Change: How did the program designers assume that change takes place? How did the program design and implementation of activities induce such desired changes? We have also often applied the RPP matrix, which examines *whom* the program works with and *what it does* (what kinds of change it promotes), as crucial elements of program strategy, and as information by which to assess the relevance of implicit and explicit Theories of Change.

In addition, CDA and RPP have been working with the OECD Development Assistance Committee to develop a general framework for the evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming.<sup>31</sup> The OECD/DAC uses five broad categories for evaluation: *relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact*. In addition, RPP considers questions of *linkages* among levels and sectors of programming and *consistency with peacebuilding values* as important criteria. These

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<sup>31</sup> See <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/24/39341279.pdf>.

categories will likely prove applicable to the IPPP Project Review, and have helped inform the preliminary lines of inquiry in Section VI below. A brief explanation of these criteria, with suggestive questions, is provided in Appendix A.

## **VI. Preliminary Lines of Inquiry**

Interviews and other forms of data collection will take place along several dimensions of change that are important to violence prevention. Where applicable, each line of inquiry below is also labeled according to the criterion/criteria that it addresses (see Addendum).

1. How do local partners and international observers understand the key driving factors of conflict in Guinea-Bissau and the likelihood that any of these might lead to violence? [Relevance]
2. How did the activities and methods used by IPPP address key driving factors of conflict—particularly those most associated with the potential for violence? Over time, have these efforts produced the desired outcomes (or unintended outcomes)? [Relevance]
3. With whom (which groups/individuals) has the IPPP worked—and which ones has it not worked with? What was the reasoning for those choices? [Relevance]
4. Among interviewees, what is their estimation of whether violence has been prevented in Guinea-Bissau? In a general sense, is Guinea-Bissau any less vulnerable to violent conflict now than it was in 2004? How do they explain any reduction in the likelihood of violence (if any)? To what do they ascribe progress: what is their assessment of the effectiveness of any/all efforts to prevent violence, and the place of IPPP initiatives among them? How do they make those assessments and what is their evidence? If so, how; if not, why not? How have changes in the context affected this? [Effectiveness and Impacts]
5. To what extent has the IPPP achieved its desired outcomes? Assuming that there have been short- and longer-term effects from IPPP efforts, to what extent have these proven sustainable? [Impacts and Sustainability]
6. How did IPPP relate to or work with other organizations and initiatives—if so, how; if not, why not? What were the results of collaboration/cooperation? What was the nature of collaborative relationships (partnerships, joint efforts, joint strategy development, exchanges/communication...), and were these effective? [Linkages]
7. Considering current political/economic/social dynamics, what are the priorities for conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau going forward? Within those priorities, what are the roles for a range of internal actors or organizations, and what are the most appropriate roles for external actors/organizations?
8. What are the broader implications that can be drawn from the IPPP experience that can help inform other conflict prevention initiatives?

Within these general lines of inquiry, the CDA team will develop a series of potential questions for use in interviews. These questions will not constitute a questionnaire or survey, but will represent a number of directions a conversation can pursue.

**Addendum: OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria as Recommended by CDA<sup>32</sup>**

CDA developed an Approach Paper for the OECD/DAC in 2006-2007. One key recommendation concerned an adaptation of the standard five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) to the context of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming. In addition, after review of additional criteria associated with humanitarian assistance and interviews with a range of practitioner, CDA recommended two additional criteria: linkages and consistency with peacebuilding values. The five original criteria and the linkage criterion are being incorporated into the official DAC evaluation guidance—and they have added the criterion of “coherence” as well.

The CDA team will not address these criteria directly in this form—but these criteria are embedded in the Lines of Inquiry presented in Section VI.

8. **Relevance and appropriateness:** Does the effort address key driving factors of conflict that constitute elements likely to lead to political violence? How?
9. **Effectiveness:** To what extent did the program achieve its stated goals?
10. **Efficiency:** Did the intervention deliver its outputs and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)?
11. **Sustainability:** Are the processes, structures and mechanisms conducted or promoted by the program likely to continue after direct involvement ends? Why or why not? To what extent were they locally-driven and how did they build upon existing social capital and in keeping with local culture?
12. **Impact:** What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort? Do these have real, ascribable impacts on key conflict or peace factors?
13. **Linkages:** How are civil society efforts linked to higher levels (national, regional) and to parallel efforts in other sectors/domains (micro-macro, across sectors)? How do country-level initiatives account for regional or international dimensions of the conflict or link to efforts that do so? Are efforts aimed at promoting individual changes in behaviour, skills and attitudes linked with change efforts at the socio-political level? How?
14. **Consistency with Peacebuilding Values:** What are the means (methods, approach, values, assumptions) of the intervention, and how are these consistent with peacebuilding ends? How do implementation personnel demonstrate sensitivity to others, lack of bias in their judgments, and respect for people with different opinions or approaches? In what ways does the intervention show conflict-sensitivity? How has the project addressed inadvertent effects that exacerbate intergroup divisions and antagonisms?

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<sup>32</sup> For a more complete description and additional explanatory questions, see the full RPP article for the OECD/DAC at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/24/39341279.pdf>.

## **Appendix B: List of People Interviewed April 2008**

### **Interviews in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau**

1. Marciano Silva Barbeiro, Minister of Defense
2. Nelvina Barreto, Ambassador Liberato Gomes, and Indrisa Djalo of Estados Gerais
3. Etchen Sambu, Director, WANEP
4. Joaozinho Mendes, Chief of Administration, Ministry of Justice
5. Mariama Camara, Teacher Trainer Institute (participated in National Action Plan meeting)
6. Macaria Barai, private sector (Western Union), Citizens Good Will Task Force, and Women's Union
7. Jamel Handem, Executive Secretary, PLACON (NGO/civil society network)
8. Rui Araujo, Minister of Public Works
9. Mamadu Jao, Director, INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa), Citizens Good Will Task Force
10. Joaozinho Ialla, National Military Reconciliation Commission
11. Francelina Silva dos Santos, Conselho Nacional de Juventude (CNJ) (National Youth Commission)
12. Josué Almeida, World Bank program, Citizens Good Will Task Force
13. Bacar Baldé, General Secretary, and Josephine Gomes Correira, Secretary of the Promotion of Female Journalists and Gender, SINJOTECS (Journalists' Union)
14. Colonel Hamet Sidibe, Representative, ECOWAS
15. Colonel Arsenio Baldé, Spokesperson, Ministry of Defense
16. Luis Vaz Martins, President, Liga de Direitos Humanos, and Bubacar Touré, Vice-president
17. Imam Aladje Abdu Baio, National Reconciliation Commission
18. Sabou de Almeida, Lingotech and Washington State University program
19. Janet Murdock, Peace & Development Advisor, UNDP

### **Interviews in Dakar, Senegal**

20. Julia Edwards, Assistant Chief of Mission, British Embassy
21. Gregory Holliday, Political Officer for Guinea-Bissau, US Embassy
22. Sadikh Niass, Coordinator, RADDHO (*rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'homme*, human rights network)

### **Interviews by phone or in person, Canada**

23. Ben Hoffman, Director, CIIAN
24. Philippe Patry, Consultant to IPPP
25. Jeffery Mapandere, CIIAN

## Appendix C: Summary of IPPP Activities (Oct 2004 – Mar 2008)

**Sources:** Grant list provided by IPPP (2008); Interviews with partner organizations (2008); Draft IPPP Case Study by Angela Kachuyevski (2007); IPPP Assessment by Guus Meijer (2006); and CIIAN web site ([www.ciian.org](http://www.ciian.org)). *This should not be considered a fully comprehensive list of all IPPP activities.* In particular, it does not reflect quiet diplomacy initiatives.

N/A = Detailed information not available

Date	Organization	Activity	Grant	Results
<b>2004</b>				
<i>Oct</i>	IPPP	1st Scouting trip	--	Confirmed selection of Guinea-Bissau for IPPP pilot project
<b>2005</b>				
<i>Jan</i>	IPPP	2 <sup>nd</sup> Scouting trip	--	Conducted “diagnostic” and initiated relationships with WANEP and Macaria Barai
<i>Feb</i>	IPPP	IPPP concept paper on reconciliation	--	N/A
<i>Apr</i>	CGWTF; IPPP	Grant to assist in formation of Citizens Good Will Task Force (CGWTF); 3 <sup>rd</sup> IPPP Trip	\$3,500	Conducted meeting on reconciliation and stabilization with representatives of civil society, UN, and military; CGWTF founded and started planning for June-July 2005 presidential elections
<i>May</i>	CGWTF	Grant to support “Peace Soldiers” and “Women’s Reconciliation Meetings”	\$5,900	N/A
<i>Jun</i>	Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces; IPPP	Military barracks support; 4 <sup>th</sup> IPPP Trip (Participants included Hoffman, Lund, Mapendere, Hayes, and Lauenstein)	\$1000	IPPP met with Gen. Tagmé and provided an initial grant to refurbish barracks (Gen. Tagmé did not subsequently request the balance of the \$10,000 grant originally offered by IPPP)
<i>Jul</i>	CGWTF	Grant to support electoral code of conduct to encourage an issue-based and peaceful presidential campaign	\$6,000	CGWTF wrote Election Code of Conduct, distributed copies, and acquired the signature of 2 of the 3 candidates; sponsored media events and advertising; distributed T-shirts and banners to educate voters and encourage participation; organized “Peace Brigades” on election day
<i>Jul</i>	CGWTF	IPPP grant for food, transportation, and lodging for journalists during run-off presidential election	\$10,000	Journalists and observers judged that IPPP funding enabled journalists to conduct independent reporting

<b>Date</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Grant</b>	<b>Results</b>
<b>2006</b>				
<i>Jan</i>	CGWTF	N/A	\$1,000	N/A
<i>Feb</i>	IPPP	Convened National Action Plan (NAP) Conference with political, military, and civil society leaders (co-organized by ECOWAS); IPPP consultants traveled to Bissau to plan and facilitate the NAP	N/A	IPPP selected PLACON (Platform for the Coordination of NGOs) to coordinate the implementation of the NAP
<i>Mar</i>	Conselho Nacional de Juventude	Funded National Youth Conference	\$3,000	400 participants from across the country met to discuss youth challenges in Guinea-Bissau
<i>Apr-Dec</i>	PLACON	IPPP provided funding for administrative support and coordination for the NAP; Josué Almeida named implementation coordinator	\$16,000	IPPP funds channeled through PLACON for NAP implementation activities
<i>Jun</i>	Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces; IPPP	Supported production of National Security Strategy Paper prior to Nov 2006 Donor Conference	\$10,000	Paid for photocopying and per diem for participating government employees
<i>Jul</i>	Estados Gerais	IPPP funded national dialogue process	\$15,000	Estados Gerais held meetings with constituencies across the country to solicit feedback on the topic of stabilizing the state
<i>Jul</i>	Search for Common Ground (SFCG) & SINJOTECS (Journalists' Union)	1 <sup>st</sup> Journalists' Conflict Reporting Workshop	\$10,000	Members of SINJOTECS noted that the training assisted journalists with coverage of student protests in 2007
<i>Jul</i>	IPPP	Small Business Incubator Study by Greg Beeton	--	Produced report identifying the need for small business development activities
<i>Dec</i>	PLACON	Cashew Conference focused on boosting production	\$7,000	N/A
<i>Dec</i>	Chamber of Commerce	Agricultural Trade Fair	\$2,000	N/A
<b>2007</b>				
<i>Feb</i>	IPPP	Funded transportation and accommodation for Military Reconciliation Commission	\$10,000	Military representatives traveled around the country to assure citizens that the military was united and would not to interfere in politics
<i>Feb</i>	Chamber of Commerce	Labor Roster promoting employment of young adults with job skills	\$6,000	N/A

<b>Date</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Grant</b>	<b>Results</b>
<i>Mar</i>	IPPP	IPPP partially funded “Road to Reconciliation” dialogue convened by ECOWAS (participation by military, political, and religious representatives)	N/A	Assisted in initiating the National Reconciliation Commission
<i>Mar</i>	SFCG & SINJOTECS	2 <sup>nd</sup> Journalists’ Conflict Reporting Workshop	\$5,500	N/A
<i>Jun</i>	IPPP	IPPP and ECOWAS hold 2 <sup>nd</sup> meeting to discuss Terms of Reference for the National Reconciliation Committee	N/A	N/A
<i>Nov</i>	Réseau Liberté & SINJOTECS	1 <sup>st</sup> Investigative Journalism Training	\$7,000	Representatives from SINJOTECS affirmed that journalists benefited from the training and some participants later conducted investigative research on energy issues, rice prices, and counterfeit medications
<b>2008</b>				
<i>Apr</i>	SINJOTECS	Journalists Conference	\$2,328	Follow up to November 2007 workshop.
<b>Total Grants (2005-2008)</b>			<b>\$131,228</b>	

## Appendix D: References

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