

# The Bissau Monitor ~ May, 2009

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Reporting Period: May 1-31, 2009

Release Date: 10 June, 2009

**Overall Trend: *Minor Improvements in most sectors, high potential for violent conflict stemming from the political and security sectors.***

## THE GENERAL SITUATION

The general situation in Guinea- Bissau can be considered to be evolving in a positive way. The following findings do not show any deterioration in the situation during the month of May.<sup>1</sup>

The most remarkable development remains the noticeable commitment of the bilateral and multilateral partners to support the transition of power within the country by providing funds or offering political support.

The security sector remains the most sensitive sector, in the sense that the nomination of the interim chief of staff and his legitimacy as well the unsolved issue of the investigation about the two assassinations of early March are triggers for potential future violent conflict. Also, the issue of drug trafficking remains a concern.

A second critical sector is the political one due particularly to the fact that we are in a transition period and the issue of the assassinations as well as the forthcoming campaign could also be triggers for violent conflict.

## THE SECURITY SECTOR

Activities related to the Security Sector Reform, seem to be less visible, since the end of the Praia Conference. One possible reason for such a slow down is the sensitivity of the issue in a period of transition with the still unsolved problem of the double assassination and the pending questions about the nomination of the Military Chief of Staff.

## THE POLITICAL SECTOR

The investigation of the assassinations by an independent international commission as well as the idea of foreign military presence to secure the political authorities and the entire transition, have been rejected by many political and military leaders. So far the domestic military enquiry has delivered unsatisfactory results according to the General Prosecutor, who claims a lack of financial resources to do the job. The international

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<sup>1</sup> The killings which occurred in early June are not reflected in this report and they will be contained in the next one.

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community and the transition authorities seem to be silent on the issue, which could later be a trigger, when the electoral campaign reaches a certain level.

## THE INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR

A third critical sector is the institutional sector where the polemic between the General prosecutor's office and the Estado Maior can degenerate if resources are not mobilized for the prosecutor to complete their investigations.

## THE ECONOMIC SECTOR

The economic sector does not show any signs of perturbation except the fact that salaries remain unpaid and water and electricity is lacking. Otherwise, the interest shown by many partners as well as the concrete contributions of some of them is a hope for optimism about the near future.

## THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR

Lastly, the civil society sector did not experience any kind of serious disorder during this reporting period, and seems to be very calm and committed to a good electoral process. Civil society organizations, even discretely, are running important activities like the recent gathering around the idea of national reconciliation and their involvement in the civic education programs.

## VIOLENCE TRIGGERS

The following four Violence Triggers were present during this reporting period:

1. Drug trafficking has not been reduced in the West Africa sub region.
2. Polemic between the General prosecutor's office and the Estado Maior about the report on the crimes investigation by the military commission.
3. Military chief of Staff advocated for a reform of the politicians.
4. The unsolved issue of the March, 2009 assassinations.

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## TARGETING VULNERABILITIES TO VIOLENCE

The following activities that address the Vulnerabilities to Violence occurred during this reporting period:

<p>TARGETING VULNERABILITIES TO VIOLENCE</p>	<p>Many bilateral and multilateral partners put the security issue on their agenda (Portugal, CPLP meeting in Luanda, Europol, UK)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CNE received equipment and financial support from many bilateral and multilateral donors.</li> <li>- Parliamentarians examine the regime of ANP</li> <li>- UNDP remits equipment for the Administration Reform project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hungarian business companies offered ambulances</li> <li>- Government fights against cashew nuts illegal exportation</li> <li>- Bauxite Angola signed agreement with Government to exploitation of reserves in Buba</li> <li>- African Development Fund supports ministry of Agriculture</li> <li>- E U and Government signed agreement for support to water and sanitation sector.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human Rights Organisations held a National Dialogue Conference</li> <li>- CNE involves Civil Society Organizations in the Civic Education campaign</li> <li>- Civil Society leaders initiated reflection on the Electoral campaign.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 13 candidates have been qualified for the Presidential elections</li> <li>- CNE seems ready to run the election (support received and civic education campaign initiated)</li> <li>- At the Praia meeting, Portugal and other participants advocate for maintaining a conducive atmosphere</li> </ul>
	<p>SV1 Security Sector</p>	<p>SV2 Institutional Sector</p>	<p>SV3 Economic Sector</p>	<p>SV4 Civil Society</p>	<p>SV5 Political Sector</p>
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## RECOMMENDATIONS: ACTIONS FOR TARGETING ACTORS AND FACTORS WHICH MAKE VIOLENT CONFLICT MORE LIKELY

The following recommendations address the gap between the Violence Triggers and the Targeted Actions from the previous two sections by targeting those remaining actors and factors which make violent conflict more likely:

- ✓ Complete the investigation into the March, 2009 assassinations and immediately release the results to the public. Take steps in advance to protect any citizens that may be endangered by the results of the investigation. Arrest those suspected of being responsible for committing these crimes and process them through normal judicial channels.
- ✓ The UN should take immediate steps to act on the request from the Prime Minister for providing greater assistance with fighting impunity.
- ✓ Take more robust actions to address the drug trafficking problem not only regionally, but at its source too by working with officials in Latin American countries to help stop the problem at its origin.
- ✓ If the Guinea-Bissau government and its security apparatus cannot ensure the safety of its citizens, including journalists, politicians, and members of civil society then the international community has the responsibility to protect these people through more interventionist approaches.
- ✓ Initiate new high-level dialogue amongst political and military leaders.
- ✓ Follow-through on the SSR plans made at the Praia conference. Monitor implementation and regularly report on progress.

### About this Report

This report is produced by the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIAN) for the International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau.

CIAN is a Canadian NGO dedicated to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict and to building sustainable peace at local, national, and international levels. For more info on CIAN or the IPPP see [www.cian.org](http://www.cian.org)

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